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I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
State responses to global warming and climate change have been far from uniform, both 
across geography and across time (S. Gupta et al. 2007). This thesis explores how states 
justify adopting or opposing certain climate change policies. The research focuses on 
Australia due to its remarkable lack of action taken to address climate change, despite its 
high ecological vulnerability, low cost of marginal abatement, and high carbon footprint. 
Australia is an energy exporting country and has some of the highest carbon emissions 
per capita on the planet, but it is highly sensitive to climate change, both in terms of the 
ecology and in terms of food and water security. Despite these sensitivities, Australia’s 
response to climate change has been markedly schizophrenic, as exemplified by years of 
increasing emissions despite concerns of global warming, its late accession to the Kyoto 
Protocol and subsequent “carbon tax”, which was followed by the current government’s 
“blood oath” to repeal existing legislation and dismantle climate change institutions 
(Grattan 2011). These hyperbolic variations beggar curiosity, and therefore this thesis 
seeks to answer the question: how do states justify adopting or opposing certain climate 
change policies?  
In order to examine the changes in the justifications for Australian climate change policies, 
this thesis traces the changes in the salience of government global warming and climate 
change discursive fields and discourses. By parsing sources from the late 1980s (when 
global warming first emerged as an international political issue) to beyond the election of 
the ‘the most environmentally hostile administration’ in Australian history in 2013 (K. 
Marks 2014), it is revealed that economic considerations have been the primary 
justifications of Australian climate policy, and that scientific and ethical considerations 
have been used to both justify and criticise a variety of policies. This sheds light on why 
Australia’s climate policy has been so dissonant, and suggests new directions future 
policymakers might take in addressing climate change. 
This thesis explores how the discourse of the Australian government has changed over 
time, and how certain stimuli have impacted on this rhetoric. This research contributes to 
the existing literature in several ways: it offers novel insights into how Australia has 
justified a variety of disparate policies; it provides a more comprehensive exploration of 
the history of the climate policies and discourse of Australia; and has the potential to act 
as a springboard for further research by exploring some of the relationships identified 
within. 
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The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. The second section provides an 
introduction to climate change, briefly discussing the global imperative to prevent it, and 
Australia’s particular vulnerabilities. The following part reviews the literature on climate 
governance and climate policies. Chapter IV discusses the theoretical framework 
underpinning the analysis. This is followed by an explanation of the methodology 
employed herein. Section VI provides the discourse analysis. Part VII summarises and 
concludes. 
I I .  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  
Before discussing climate change, it is first necessary to clarify what is meant by the term, 
the consequences of unabated warming, and to provide a brief background on the 
political responses so far. 
A .  T h e  S u p e r  W i c k e d  P r o b l e m  
A “wicked problem” is a problem facing policymakers that ‘defies resolution because of 
the enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders’ 
(Lazarus 2010, 10750). A “super wicked problem” is more complex, in that in addition to 
the characteristics of a wicked problem, it also involves an impending and expiring 
deadline to act, an absence of a strong central authority to address the issue, the dilemma 
that those who are responsible for causing the problem must act to address it, and very 
high and irrational discount rates of future problems, promoting myopic behaviour 
(Levin et al. 2010, 5–7; Levin et al. 2012, 124). Climate change is a super wicked problem. 
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
“climate change” means ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to 
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods’ (United 
Nations). While slightly tautological, this definition clearly demonstrates the focus of 
climate change: atmospheric composition. This definition has been criticised for focusing 
too heavily on anthropocentric greenhouse gas (GHG; notably carbon dioxide (CO2)) 
contributions and thus energy policy (Pielke 2005), however due to its widespread 
acceptance it will be used herein. What does need greater explanation however, are the 
consequences of climate change, and the imperative of appropriate policy responses. 
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B .  “ O f  D r o u g h t s  a n d  F l o o d i n g  R a i n s ”  
When one thinks of global warming or climate change, the usual manifestations conjured 
are warmer temperatures, melting icecaps, and rising sea-levels. While these are indeed 
realities of climate change, they are but the tip of the iceberg. The full impact of a warmer 
world runs a much larger gamut, with many more consequences directly affecting 
humanity. 
Due to the immensity, uncertainty, and variety of the impacts of climate change, only the 
very briefest of overviews can be included here. According to the Stern Review, climate 
change will impact on ‘the basic elements of life for people around the world—access to 
water, food production, health, and the environment’ (Stern 2006, vi). The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has released catalogues of impacts, 
including ‘hundreds of millions of people [becoming] exposed to increased water stress’, 
significant global extinctions, increased wildfire risk, decreased food production, 
increased damage from floods and storms, changing distribution of disease vectors, an 
‘increasing burden from malnutrition, diarrhoeal, cardio-respiratory, and infectious 
diseases’, and ‘increased morbidity and mortality from heat waves, floods, and droughts’ 
(Parry et al. 2007, 10). The World Bank has released concurring reports, stressing heat 
extremes, water stress, increasing food insecurity, sea-level rise, ocean acidification, and 
climate refugees (Schellnhuber et al. 2013, xvii–xviii). Australia in particular is ‘highly 
vulnerable’ to the effects of climate change (McKinnon 2012), and is likely to suffer 
because of water stress, increased salinisation, decreased food production, more intense 
storms and bushfires, and greater infrastructural damage from flooding and storm surges 
(Lyster 2004, 566–567). Although it is impossible to precisely determine what will happen, 
these are the likely consequences for inadequate action. Therefore, when considering the 
discourses presented below, it must be remembered that these threats are the impetus for 
action. 
The IPCC warns that a warming of 2°C (from pre-industrial times) is the tipping point 
between what we see now, and those aforementioned catastrophes plus feedback loops 
that will increase the speed and severity of further warming (Stocker et al. 2013). Already 
Earth is 0.8°C warmer than pre-industrial times (Schellnhuber et al. 2013, xvii). What then, 
have the nations of the world done to stem this existential threat? 
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C .  P r o g r e s s  S o  F a r  
This section provides a very rudimentary snapshot of the recent history of climate change 
policies. It does not look at the effectiveness of specific policies, as that is an area of great 
contention and disagreement.  
Climate change emerged onto the international political scene in the late 1980s. Since that 
time there have been countless fora, conferences, negotiations, summits, reports and 
meetings discussing how it should be addressed. As it influences the global commons, 
has a trans-boundary nature, and spills over onto non-environmental issues, no 
consensual agreement has been reached (Young 1994, 20–26). Moreover, the time lags, 
scientific uncertainties, and the progress of technological development have further 
compounded the already significant difficulties (Nordhaus 1994, 4–5). 
The most notable achievement arising from climate change negotiations is the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. Countries which signed and ratified the Protocol had to meet pre-determined 
emissions reductions targets by 2012. There is a second period of further reductions for 
the period of 2013–20. Australia signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, but did not ratify until 
2007. Australia’s target was an increase of eight per cent in emissions on 1990 levels by 
2012. Australia achieved this target, largely due to concessions it was awarded during the 
negotiations phase enabling it to include emissions from land clearing, thereby artificially 
increasing its baseline (C. Hunt 2004, 156). 
Australia has introduced several different greenhouse policies, with the most recent being 
the emissions trading scheme (ETS; also known as a “cap and trade” system), and its 
would-be replacement, the Direct Action Plan (DAP). The ETS was introduced in July 
2012. An ETS sets a limit on the total amount of national emissions, divides this total into 
a specified number of emissions permits, and allocates these permits amongst industry. 
Industry must then either reduce its emissions to comply with their permit allocation, or 
purchase additional permits from third parties who do not require such a high threshold. 
The Coalition government of Australia which came to power in 2013 campaigned hard on 
a platform to repeal this “carbon tax”,1 and to replace it with DAP. Under DAP, businesses 
submit tenders for government funds to lower emissions. It functions as a reverse auction, 
with the lowest bidder winning. Businesses then ostensibly use the money to complete 
their proposal, however there are no ramifications for failing to do so. 
                                                 
1 Although technically an ETS, the policy was referred to as a ‘tax’ because in the first stage of the ETS 
there was no emissions limit, permits could not be traded, and the permits had a fixed price. Therefore the 
ETS acted like a tax, despite technically being something else. 
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At the time of writing, DAP is not yet implemented, and the repeal of the ETS has failed 
to pass both houses of parliament. 
I I I .  E X P L A I N I N G  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A C T I O N  &  
I N A C T I O N  
The literature on political responses to climate change falls into two broad categories: 
assessments of international climate negotiations and the hurdles of collective climate 
action; and analyses of positions, preferences and policies enacted at the domestic level. 
Concerning the former, much of the literature takes state positions as given and focuses 
on how international negotiations have occurred (Ward, Grundig, and Zorick 2001). 
Drawing heavily on rational choice and game theoretic approaches, this literature often 
focuses on the institutional framework in which the negotiations take place, the incentives 
to free-ride (Ward 1996), two-level games involving states and lobbies (D. F. Sprinz and 
Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004), the outcomes sought (Tingley and Tomz 2014), the general 
feasibility of collective climate action (Finus 2002), and the limits of international climate 
regimes (Keohane and Victor 2011). The problem with these systemic game theoretic and 
rational choice models however is that they ascribe rationality, and require player 
positions to be predefined. These positions are often taken as purely representative of the 
financial costs of abatement, which while parsimonious for such models, fail to portray 
the many nuances of climate geopolitics. 
In order to better appreciate the nature of state climate positions, authors have begun to 
unpack the state, and examine how political positions on climate change are formed. 
Interest-based approaches are the simplest method for explaining climate preferences, 
however they are also the least accurate (Rootes, Zito, and Barry 2012). They declare that 
states only take action on climate change when such action is aligned with national 
interests, whatever they might be. Moreover, the interest-based models are largely static, 
whereas in reality preferences are dynamic and malleable. Such approaches have looked 
at state vulnerability to climate change (D. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994; Rowlands 1995), 
perceptions of risk (Bulkeley 2001a), fossil fuel industries in the national economy 
(Paterson and Grubb 1992), domestic political interests (Hochstetler and Viola 2012), 
international political developments (Kasa 2013; Takao 2012), the strategies employed by 
politicians (Bailey et al. 2012), and the influence of multi-national corporations (Rowlands 
2001; Levy and Kolk 2002; Levy and Newell 2002). 
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However, while interest-based approaches provided a substantial foundation for 
examining state climate preferences, their inaccuracy has resulted in an expansion of 
possible explanations. Further research has focused on willpower of political leaders 
(McDonald 2013a; Eckersley 2013), the significance of “climate campaigners” (Christoff 
2005), the interplay of climate norms with national cultures (Elliott 2011; Stevenson 2009; 
Crowley 2007), ethical ignorance (McDonald 2005), political partisanship (Tranter 2013; 
Fielding et al. 2012), the salience of post-materialist values (Inglehart 1995), and even the 
state’s place within the geopolitical space-time continuum (Williams and Booth 2013). 
It is clear that the international politics of climate change have received a great deal of 
scholarly attention, and the situation in Australia is no exception. In addition to some of 
the above explanations, authors have sought to explain climate policy in Australia by 
looking at the population’s belief in climate change (Tranter 2013; Leviston et al. 2014; 
Stefanova 2013), technological and regulatory inertia (Mikler and Harrison 2013), 
Australia’s membership in international organisations (Lawrence 2009), the beliefs of 
Australia’s Prime Ministers (PMs) (Curran 2011; Fielding et al. 2012; Boswell, Niemeyer, 
and Hendriks 2013; Hawke 1989), and the potential for carbon sequestration (Buizer and 
Lawrence 2013). 
Despite the relatively high amount of literature on this topic, several gaps exist. Firstly, 
most of the above analyses have only been employed over one incident in particular: 
Australia’s 2007 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the implementation of the ETS. 
How climate policy justifications have changed since global warming first emerged as a 
political issue in the late 1980s has been relatively neglected, as has the current 
government’s crusade against existing climate policies. Moreover, the existing literature 
does not examine how the justification discourse is affected by extraneous stimuli, such 
as natural disasters, national elections, and the health of the national economy. 
So although much has been researched and written with regards to climate change, the 
fact that it remains an impending problem means that further study is warranted. 
Therefore, this thesis adds to the existing panoply of scholarship by examining previously 
unscrutinised stimuli, and analysing the relationship between climate change discourse, 
climate policy, and the aforementioned stimuli. 
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I V .  A N A L Y S I N G  T H E  L E G I T I M A T I O N  O F  C L I M A T E  
C H A N G E  P O L I C Y  
In order to answer “how do states justify adopting or opposing certain climate change 
policies?” several concepts must be introduced. These include the “climate discourse 
complex” (CDC), the “governmental legitimation rhetoric” (GLR), and the “national 
climate policy regime” (NCPR). 
A .  T h e  C l i m a t e  D i s c o u r s e  C o m p l e x  
A discourse is ‘a collection of stories, narratives, scripts, myths, legends, and sagas 
accounting for events, usually developed chronologically and sequentially, to indicate a 
causal relationship between one event and another’ (Butteriss, Wolfenden, and Goodridge 
2001, 49). It is ‘a shared way of apprehending the world’ and they ‘construct meanings 
and relationships, helping to define common sense and legitimate knowledge’ (Dryzek 
2005, 9). Consequently, Peter Christoff defines the CDC as ‘a dominant… ensemble of… 
climate discourses arising from several fields…that frames and governs public and 
private practices’ (Christoff 2013, 354). In essence, the CDC is the framework in which 
society as a whole discusses climate change. According to Christoff, the discursive fields 
of the CDC are the scientific, the ethical, the economic, the technological, the political/legal, and 
the “lived reality”. The CDC is dynamic and provides the parameters within which the 
national climate policy regime lies. 
While Christoff’s CDC and its discursive fields are a useful starting point, it needs to be 
updated. This thesis uses the six discursive fields as a point of origin, but expands upon 
them by identifying the prominent (including the hegemonic, dominant, and 
marginalised) discourses within each field. Consider the scientific discursive field as an 
example. Christoff defines it as ‘framing discourses about the nature and material impacts 
of human and non-human contributions to climate change’ (Christoff 2013, 356). After 
reviewing the literature the prominent discourses within each field are readily 
identifiable. Accordingly, the prominent discourses of the scientific field are climate change 
scepticism (i.e. doubt of its occurrence), natural climate variability (i.e. acceptance of its 
occurrence but doubt as to the role of humanity), and anthropocentric climate change (i.e. 
acceptance that humanity is causing or accelerating climate change) (Hoffman 2010; 
Lahsen 2013; Antilla 2005; Poortinga et al. 2011). By enumerating these discourses within 
the discursive field, a more accurate and illuminating picture can be provided by the 
discourse analysis. It must also be mentioned that the fields are not self-contained—they 
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interact and influence one another. Therefore, the following discourses and discursive 
fields are prominent in the Australian CDC: 
Economic Scientific Energy & 
Technology 
Ethical Political/Legal Social Impact 
Traditional Climate change 
scepticism 
Fossil fuels Fellowship Emissions 
targets 
Domestic 
impact 
Sustainable Natural climate 
variability 
Nuclear Leadership Carbon markets International 
impact 
 Anthropocentric 
climate change 
Renewables  Subsidies  
    International 
agreements 
 
Table 1: Discursive Fields and Prominent Discourses of the Climate Discourse Complex 
Brief descriptions of each discourse and the sources of their identification are provided in 
Appendix A (below). Note that this list is not exhaustive, it merely contains the most 
prominent discourses. The role of the CDC in this thesis is that it acts as the foundation of 
the GLR. 
B .  T h e  G o v e r n m e n t a l  L e g i t i m a t i o n  R h e t o r i c  
The GLR is a novel concept developed in this thesis in order to analyse the trends in how 
climate change policies are legitimated and justified. The GLR draws on the CDC, in that 
the GLR amplifies or silences specific discourses from within the CDC. While made of the 
same discursive fields, the main differences between the CDC and GLR is that the GLR is 
comprised only of government discourses (as opposed to society as a whole), and that the 
GLR is a conscious portrayal, and not an organic cluster of narratives. In essence, the GLR 
is the dynamic collection of discourses used to justify and legitimate, or oppose and 
criticise, climate change policies. 
This thesis analyses how the GLR has changed over time, and also how it has responded 
to a variety of exogenous shocks. 
C .  T h e  N a t i o n a l  C l i m a t e  P o l i c y  R e g i m e  
Christoff adapts Krasner’s definition of international regimes as ‘implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1983, 2), to create 
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the concept of the NCPR.  This concept provides a useful framework for describing a 
state’s overall policy position. Therefore, the GLR exists to defend the NCPR.  
This thesis charts the history and transformations of the NCPR and examines how the 
NCPR has been justified (or challenged) by the incumbent (or opposition) government 
using the GLR.  
D .  H y p o t h e s e s   
1. Hypothesis 1—Policies & Justifications 
This hypothesis considers the relationship between the GLR and the NCPR. As the GLR 
can be employed to legitimate and justify policies, or to criticise and oppose them, it 
would be logically inconsistent if the same discourses were employed to both justify and 
criticise similar NCPRs. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that governments are 
logical and actually mean what they say. One should therefore expect to see a certain 
coherence in the dominant discourses used to justify and legitimate policies under the 
NCPR. For example, it would be highly surprising if a government were to use discourses 
of anthropocentric climate change to oppose adopting climate change policies. 
H1a: The dominant discourses espoused via the GLR should be logically coherent with the 
types of policies promoted by the NCPR. 
Moreover, due to the impartiality of the effects of climate change, it is expected that the 
primary justifications for climate change policies have stemmed from the social impact and 
scientific discursive fields: 
H1b: The primary justifications of the Australian climate policy regime have stemmed 
from the social impact and scientific discursive fields. 
2. Hypothesis 2—Economic Slowdowns 
The consequences of the health of the economy and the global financial crisis (GFC) are 
largely undiscussed in the existing literature on climate change, especially in the 
Australian context. Using changes in gross domestic product (GDP) as a parsimonious 
indicator of economic health, this thesis examines the effects of recessions and slowdowns 
on the GLR. It is probable that the recent historical health of the economy will trump 
vaporous future concerns about climate change (due to the primacy of the ideal of 
neoliberal economics present in the Australian political culture) and thus have a direct 
effect on the dominance of the economical discursive field: 
H2: In the wake of a recession or economic slowdown, the economic discursive field in the 
GLR will increase in dominance. 
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3. Hypothesis 3—Natural Disasters 
Hypothesis 3 is also based on an omission in the literature, namely the effect of natural 
disasters on climate policy. One of the most observable implications of climate change is 
that natural disasters will increase in intensity (Schellnhuber et al. 2013). However, a 
significant impediment to taking action on climate change is that the magnitude of these 
intensified disasters are often extremely discounted, resulting in a cost-benefit analysis 
that advocates inaction (Finus 2002). Therefore, the occurrence of a natural disaster, 
especially a disaster beyond the magnitude of so-called “3-sigma” event,2 could arguably 
act as a catalyst for a change in the dominant discursive discourse. Therefore: 
H3: In the wake of a natural disaster, the social impact field of the GLR will increase in 
dominance. 
4. Hypothesis 4—National Elections 
There is an emerging component of the literature which discusses the importance of 
political leaders on climate policy (J. Gupta and Grubb 2000; Eckersley 2013; Fielding et 
al. 2012). There is also literature which outlines the significance of the public’s perception 
of climate change (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Niemeyer 2013; Carson, Louviere, and Wei 
2010; Corner et al. 2011). However, these discussions have of yet not assessed how such 
factors influence the GLR. By combining the democratic functioning of the Australian 
parliament, the high level of partisanship in the Australian electorate (Tranter 2013), and 
the weight of political leaders with respect to the direction of national climate policies, the 
following hypothesis emerges:  
H4: A national election is likely to increase the salience of marginalised discourses in the 
GLR. 
5. Hypothesis 5—International Climate Negotiations 
The final hypothesis adapts existing hypotheses surrounding international political 
pressure to the current discourse framework. One of the most often encountered reasons 
for explaining the lack of progress in addressing climate change is that governments have 
an incentive to free-ride and cannot rectify the “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (Heitzig, Lessmann, and Zou 2011; Kaitala and Pohjola 1995; Rajamani 
2000; Stone 2004; Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; Ward 1996; Finus 2002). It follows 
therefore that the occurrence of international climate negotiations will affect the GLR in 
Australia. Therefore: 
                                                 
2 According to The World Bank, 3-sigma events occur once every 740 years; 5-sigma events once every 
several million years. The 2012 US heat wave and the 2010 Russian heat wave classify as 3-sigma events. 
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H5: The occurrence of international climate negotiations is likely to increase the salience 
of the ethical discursive field in the GLR. 
The veracity of the above hypotheses will be assessed by an examination of Australian 
GLR on climate change policies over the past three decades. 
V .  A  D I S C U R S I V E  A N A L Y S I S  O F  C L I M A T E  P O L I C Y  
This thesis analyses the Australian government’s discourse from the late 1980s through to 
2014. Australia is chosen as the case study due to the significant transformations and 
subsequent reversal of its preferences for addressing climate change, the accessibility of 
sources, and the inherent interest to the author. 
Discourse analysis is an appropriate technique to showcase the evolution of climate policy 
justification due to its ability to ‘illuminate how policies are shaped by the interpretation 
of problems and their subsequent transformation into practice’ (Tellmann 2012, 748). It 
rests on the assumption that ‘language matters, that the way we construct, interpret, 
discuss, and analyze [sic] environmental problems has all kinds of consequences’ (Dryzek 
2005, 10). 
Governmental discourse is readily available, and is relatively reliable in a strong 
democratic country such as Australia. Indeed, as discourse analysis is best suited to 
addressing how policies are legitimated (rather than why they are enacted), it is an 
appropriate research methodology in this case (Eckersley 2013, 383). 
A variety of theoretical approaches have informed the hypotheses and concepts, in 
addition to the author’s observations. These theories include realism (Waltz 1990), 
liberalism & two-level games (Moravcsik 1997; Putnam 1988), game theory & rational 
choice (Grundig 2009; Ward 1996), social constructivism & international political 
sociology (Bigo 2008; Bigo and Walker 2007; Tellmann 2012; Eckersley 2013; Pettenger 
2013), and regime theory & multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders 2004; G. Marks 
and Hooghe 2004; Liesbet and Gary 2003; Krasner 1983; Keohane and Victor 2011). While 
the analytical framework draws on insights from multiple theoretical perspectives, as the 
methodology employs discourse analysis it proceeds largely from a constructivist 
perspective.  
It is prudent to outline the theoretical underpinnings of discourse analysis and the manner 
of its employment here. When analysing discourses, it is imperative to pay attention not 
only to the choice of words, but also to the context in which they are employed. The 
specifics of discourse analysis have been enumerated by multiple authors, who suggest 
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that the analyst examine the formation and use of concepts, the placement of tropes and 
metaphors, choices in framing, the dominant stories and narratives, and the sources of 
validation (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996; Fairclough 1992; Butteriss, Wolfenden, and 
Goodridge 2001). However, as the discourses are analysed through the lens of the 
researcher, there is the risk of imputing or constructing meanings which do not exist 
(Snow 2004). 
John Dryzek has espoused a widespread framework for discourse analysis on 
environmental problems, focusing on the basic entities recognised or constructed, the 
assumptions about natural relationships, the agents and their motives, and they key 
metaphors and rhetorical devices (Dryzek 2005, 19). Dryzek’s method has been adapted 
from environmental problems in general to climate change in particular by Silje Tellmann 
(Tellmann 2012). Tellmann’s refined model suggests looking at the following indicators 
to identify discourses: the problem definition; the contextual framing of the problem; the 
problem solution; legitimating arguments & key concepts; and the knowledge base. 
Consequently, this thesis employs this lens to analyse the discourse of the Australian 
government surrounding the justification of climate change policies. A point of contention 
however is that the analysis takes place within a predetermined structure (that is, the 
fields and discourses are previously identified). While this is in line with how Tellmann 
and Dryzek performed their analyses, it does run the risk of creating artificial boundaries 
or excluding some discourses (Butteriss, Wolfenden, and Goodridge 2001). However, this 
risk is minimised by the broad research undertaken to ensure the most accurate 
construction of the CDC possible. 
The government discourse which is the focus of this paper includes discourses of both the 
incumbent government and the opposition, as well as any large minorities (such as the 
Greens party). The focus on the government is legitimised by the aim of this thesis, namely 
to see how the state’s justification of certain policies has changed over time. An argument 
could be made that by focusing on only governmental discourse, the influence of other 
fields will be ignored (such as that of industry). However, it is posited that if such fields 
are influential their discourses will be absorbed by the government, and thus this poses 
no significant barrier. Moreover, the aim of this thesis is not to analyse the 
interrelationship between industrial or other discourses with that of the government, yet 
that could be an avenue for further research. 
A wide range of sources were parsed to perform the discourse analysis. These sources 
include: the National Library of Australia’s PANDORA web archive; Hansard federal 
parliamentary transcripts; election speeches and campaign materials from the Museum of 
Australian Democracy; political party media releases; reports and documents from 
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existing and defunct governmental departments and agencies (including the Departments 
of: Agriculture; Defence; Foreign Affairs and Trade; Industry; the Environment; the 
Attorney-General; Climate Change (defunct); and, Prime Minister and Cabinet); and a 
wide range of academic articles, books, and national & international periodicals. 
V I .  T H E  J U S T I F I C A T I O N  A N D  L E G I T I M A T I O N  O F  
A U S T R A L I A N  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  P O L I C Y  
A .  A u s t r a l i a ’ s  G o v e r n m e n t a l  L e g i t i m a t i o n  R h e t o r i c  
a n d  C l i m a t e  P o l i c y  R e g i m e ,  1 9 8 7 – 2 0 1 4  
The schizophrenic nature of the Australian NCPR is perfectly captured by Talberg, Hui 
and Loynes: 
Australia’s commitment to climate action over the past three decades could be seen as 
inconsistent and lacking in direction. At times Australia has been an early adopter, 
establishing the world’s first government agency dedicated to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions; signing on to global climate treaties the same day they are created; establishing 
the world’s first emissions trading scheme…; and pioneering an innovative land-based 
carbon offset scheme. But at other times, and for many reasons, Australia has erratically 
altered course: disbanding the climate change government agency, creating a new one 
then disbanding that; refusing to ratify global treaties until the dying minute; and 
introducing legislation to repeal the national ETS (Talberg, Hui, and Loynes 2013). 
This section examines how the GLR has employed discourses from the CDC to justify and 
legitimate the ever-changing NCPR. Although some 16 prominent discourses have been 
identified in the Australian CDC (such as “renewable energy” or “carbon markets”) that 
belong to the six discursive fields outlined above, only a handful of these have been truly 
dominant in the GLR. What is more, conflict between incumbent and opposition 
discourses is a relatively recent phenomenon, and only really emerged in the mid-2000s.  
Generally speaking, the NCPR can be grouped into four different periods. These are the 
“no regrets” policies of the late 1980s until the fall of the Keating administration, the 
nominal and voluntary posturing of Prime Minister Howard’s reign, the “markets and 
targets” of Rudd-Gillard-Rudd administrations, and most recently the Coalition’s “blood 
oath” to ‘axe the tax’ and establish Direct Action. 
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1. ”No Regrets”: 1987–96 
Looking at the current situation of the Australian GLR, one might be forgiven for 
believing that climate change had always evoked partisan separation. However, 
beginning in the late 1980s both major Australian parties (the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) and the Coalition/Liberal Party) espoused more or less similar discourses on global 
warming. 3  Indeed it was not until around 1997 that significant differences in party 
discourses emerged.  
The “no regrets” era of 1987–96 was characterised by policies which sought to reduce 
GHGs as well as provide economic benefits, or at least no economic losses 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992). The policies were very cautious and sought to 
maintain the status quo, as state and federal governments were not required to commit to 
any definitive reductions in any definitive timeframe (Taplin 1995, 18). The “no regrets” 
campaign consisted of approximately $1 billion allocated to provide incentives to reduce 
emissions and encourage investment in cleaner technology. These goals were to be 
achieved by a variety of programmes including: the Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Programme (to encourage the development of carbon sinks); the Greenhouse Challenge 
(where businesses could publically report on their reduction progress); suggested 
improvements to Generator Efficiency Standards (for improved energy efficiency); and 
applying a mandatory Renewable Energy Target (RET; which forced power generators to 
supply a very small percentage of renewable energy) (Australian Government 2002). Due 
to their largely voluntary nature, and the absence of a “polluter pays” methodology, these 
policies have since been described ‘arbitrary’, ‘administratively cumbersome’, 
‘ineffectual’, and burdensome for taxpayers (C. Hunt 2004, 162). 
Nevertheless, during their time these policies were underscored by discourses from both 
the ALP and the Coalition promoting the scientific discursive field. For example, the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) held multiple 
conferences and released several papers in 1988, which stated that ‘the climate is 
changing’ and argued that ‘mankind is strongly implicated in these changes’ (Pearman 
1988), and outlined the likely negative effects of climate change on bushfires (Beer, Gill, 
and Moore), and the water supply (Peck and Allison 1988), amongst others. Despite the 
acceptance of some of CSIRO’s observations of a changing climate, politicians debated the 
science as to why the climate was changing: was humanity to blame? 
                                                 
3 The ALP is a centre-left party. The misnomered Liberal Party is centre-right. When in power, the Liberal 
Party joins forces with the National Party, the Country Liberal Party, and the Liberal National Party, 
resulting in what is commonly referred to as the Coalition. 
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This early dominance of the scientific field is an expected observation, as the revelations 
of climate science were emerging onto the global stage, yet its relative novelty meant that 
disagreement as to the precise cause or nature of climate change could still be taken 
seriously. Supporting these scientific discourses were discussions surrounding “climate 
justice” and questions of responsibility for emissions abatement, as well as of notions of 
sustainable development. For example, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (ALP) declared 
‘climate change and the protection of the atmosphere [to be] the biggest problem, the 
biggest challenge, faced by mankind in this or any other age’ (Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates 1989, 814), and Prime Minister Bob Hawke (ALP) agreed that 
‘there is no greater global environmental concern than the greenhouse effect’, and that 
‘the most cost-effective’ measure was to reconsider energy policy (Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates 1991, 5124). 
The combination of the scientific, ethical and economic fields led to talk of national emission 
reduction targets attaining dominance in the final years of the Hawke administration. It 
is interesting to note that both the incumbent and opposition parties put forward similar 
positions on global warming at this stage. This indicates that action on global warming 
was a bipartisan issue. These emission reduction policies were underpinned by discourses 
of sustainable development and ethical concerns stemming from the revelations of climate 
science, and the Australian NCPR circled around adoption of the Toronto Targets. 
Established in 1988, these targets called for a 20% reduction of global CO2 emissions by 
2005. On balance, there was bipartisan support for their adoption, yet with Paul Keating 
(ALP) assuming Prime Ministership in late 1991, no enabling legislation was ever passed 
(Bulkeley 2001b, 158). Consequently the Keating administration put environmental issues 
on the backburner, which began a change in discourse dominance that continued 
throughout the Howard years. 
The displaced environmental issues were usurped by strong discourses promoting 
traditional economic concerns. This was preceded by the birth of the so-called 
“greenhouse mafia”—a powerful lobby of vested interests that represented carbon 
intensive businesses, notably the fossil fuel industry, which formed in 1990 (Pearse 2007). 
The precise influence of this lobby cannot be specified, but what is clear is that from 
Keating’s ascension in 1991 to John Howard’s (Liberal) fall in 2007, the dominant 
discourses of the government were focused on traditional economic calculations 
underscored by growth derived from fossil fuels. And while renewable energy 
technology discourses did feature intermittently during those 15 years, the primacy of 
fossil fuels in underpinning Australian economic growth went largely unchallenged.  
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Other than the significant favouring of fossil fuels and a reversion to traditional economic 
conceptions, the GLR during Keating’s administration was not overly different from the 
GLR of Hawke’s government. This is very interesting, because the same supporting 
discourses were enunciated during each period, yet the Keating administration was 
markedly less environmentally friendly than Hawke’s and possessed a different NCPR. 
This echoes the concern outlined above, whereby the rhetoric uttered by an institution 
need not necessarily be a true and accurate representation of their underlying 
motivations. Alternatively, it could merely demonstrate the extensive influence of the 
“greenhouse mafia”. 
2. Nominal and Voluntary Posturing: 1996–2007 
It is during the Howard years that the first challenges to the incumbent discourses appear. 
The severity of the change in discourse is succinctly summarised by an anonymous 
government official quoted in 1996: 
The Australian position [with respect to climate change] has changed from being a very 
wide one that recognised the science, the need to be putting new technologies into 
developing countries and giving them financial assistance, and that recognised the need 
for adaptation strategies but also included trade concerns. Now, instead of the holistic 
approach, we've zoomed in on the bottom line and trade is the only driving consideration 
(Gilchrist 1996). 
The NCPR during PM Howard’s era was characterised by token statements of Australia 
being a “good global citizen” and doing its fair share to address global warming, while at 
the same time questioning its underlying science and offering unyielding resistance to the 
Kyoto Protocol (Pincock 2007, 337). Prime Minister Howard argued that ratifying the 
protocol ‘would cost us [Australia] jobs and damage our industry’ (Roarty 2002), and 
supported the USA’s criticism of the Kyoto Protocol (“EU Urges U.S. to Reconsider Global 
Warming Treaty” 2001). The resulting policies largely followed the “no regrets” line, yet 
from late 2006 talk of carbon markets gained prominence. In response to offers made by 
the opposition, the Coalition government promised (if re-elected) to take steps to set up 
an ETS, conduct an economic analysis of its effect on the Australian economy, and 
increase the proportion of electricity generated by low-emissions sources (Macintosh, 
Wilkinson, and Denniss 2010). However as these policy promises were made at the end 
of Howard’s administration, their role in the NCPR was negligible. 
From 1996 until 2007 discourses of traditional economics and fossil fuels were used 
heavily to legitimate and justify what few policies did exist. The prime objective of climate 
policy during the Howard years was ostensibly to deliver a ‘strategic and dynamic 
response to climate change which is capable of protecting our economic interests’ (Reuters 
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News 1996a). To appreciate the supremacy of fossil fuel discourses during this decade, 
one need only look at the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean Development and 
Climate. Before its disintegration in 2011, the APP was an international association of 
governments founded (largely by Australian and the United States of America (USA)) as 
an alternative means to address climate change (Lawrence 2009, 282). Instead of relying 
on mandated targets and deadlines, the APP members preferred to suggest voluntary 
measures and opt for industrial cooperation, with only nominal mentions of alternative 
technologies and renewable energy (Christoff and Eckersley 2007, 35). This is clearly 
stated in the AAP’s communiqué to its members, specifying that all members had 
‘recognised that fossil fuels underpin[s] [their] economies, and will be an enduring reality 
for [their] lifetimes and beyond’ (AAP 2006a). This is reflected in statements made by the 
Coalition administration defending the coal industry and claiming that if they were made 
to reduce emissions it ‘would do great damage to the economy of [Australia]’ (AAP 
2006b). 
Additionally, notions of international fellowship and Australia “doing its fair share” were 
also used as justification, which stand at quite the contrast to Howard’s disdain for and 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (see E. International Climate Negotiations, page 39, 
below). Although the government espoused support for international agreements, it 
vehemently opposed binding targets, due largely to a perception of unfairness. The Labor 
opposition under Kim Beazley and Simon Crean projected strong alternative discourses 
in support of the Kyoto Protocol and the adoption of binding national targets. They 
claimed that Australia’s emissions ‘would be slashed in half’ if they came to power, by 
way of an ETS, increased renewable energy generation and the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Peatling 2006). These discourses never gained traction however and faded from 
the public realm until a brief reappearance in 2002. The Kyoto Protocol again was the 
impetus for these alternative discourses, emerging as they did when PM Howard stated 
that ratifying the Protocol was against Australia’s interests. The ALP opposition 
promoted not ‘just a strong economy, [but] a sustainable economy as well’ and supported 
Kyoto as it is the ‘best international framework to achieve [a] solution’ (Crean 2002). Such 
discourses peaked when the incumbent Coalition performed a turnaround on their new 
‘four-pronged policy response’ (Minister for the Environment and Heritage Dr David 
Kemp and Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer 2002), (comprised of 
international unity, a strong but clean fossil fuel powered economy, government-business 
linkages, and domestic and international adaptation programmes) and declared it to be 
economically unviable. However these alternative discourses could not topple the 
dominance of traditional economic thought and fossil fuels. Curiously, PM Howard used 
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an admission of the anachronistic nature of these dominant discourses to rule out ratifying 
Kyoto, stating that there is 
one thing I am frozen in time about and that is a determination to protect the industries of 
this country that give us a natural competitive advantage. I am frozen in time on that 
because I believe in the coal industry and I believe in preserving the competitive advantage 
we now have that is why… we didn’t sign Kyoto, because Kyoto could well have put us 
at a competitive disadvantage (Pearse 2007, 131). 
Nevertheless, the discourses which had been entrenched as offering legitimacy for the 
past decade were significantly challenged when Labor won the election under the 
leadership of Kevin Rudd in 2007. 
3. Markets and Targets: 2007–2013 
Rudd’s first official act of government was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Subsequently an 
ETS was developed and there was significant research and development into renewable 
energy. This is clearly mirrored by a change in the dominant discourses in the GLR, most 
evidently with changes in the economic discursive field, and the ethical and political & legal 
fields achieving dominance. 
Although the economic field remained hegemonic, the focus shifted from a traditional 
economic perspective to a new, sustainable perspective supported by an ETS. This was 
accompanied by a decrease in the salience of fossil fuels as underwriting the Australian 
economy, and the emergence of renewable energy and innovation powering future 
Australian prosperity. Moreover, Rudd’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was 
accompanied by a strong political & legal discursive field, as discussions about carbon 
markets, emissions reductions targets and international agreements made the headlines. 
The ethical field underwent a strong resurgence, as noted by Rudd calling climate change 
the ‘great[est] moral, environmental and economic challenge of our age’ (Rudd 2009). 
Despite the leadership change resulting from Julia Gillard’s (ALP) Prime Ministerial coup 
in 2010, the GLR did not change radically, nor did the NCPR. Her government adopted a 
watered-down version of the ETS, perhaps largely due to the fact that her minority 
government required the support of the Greens.(Quiggan 2013). Talk of markets being the 
best method for managing emissions remained dominant in the incumbent government, 
with Gillard declaring that she was ‘determined to price carbon’ (AAP 2011b), and Federal 
Treasurer Wayne Swan (ALP) agreeing that pricing carbon was an ‘entirely responsible 
decision’ (Hutchens 2013). Conversely, the Liberal opposition under Nelson, Turnbull 
and then Abbott offered alternative discourses, namely traditional economic thought, but 
also climate change scepticism, concerns about the ethical responsibility Australia was 
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ostensibly undertaking, and the importance of coal and other fossil fuels. Examples of 
these alternative discourses can be found below.  
Rudd became PM again in the middle of 2013 for a mere three months, and there was little 
change in the GLR associated with that change of leadership 
4. ‘Axe the Tax’: 2014 
It would not be difficult to argue that the NCPR of Tony Abbot’s Coalition government is 
the antithesis of Rudd’s ALP administration. Indeed, since being elected in 2013, the main 
pillar of the Coalition’s climate policy has been to reverse the policies of Rudd and Gillard. 
The ETS is set for repeal in July 2014, the RET is to be decreased, and a policy known as 
“Direct Action” is to be introduced (Australian Government Department of the 
Environment 2014). If enacted, this policy would establish an Emissions Reduction Fund, 
call for high polluters to submit tenders for projects to lower their emissions, and the 
winner would receive money from the fund to ostensibly complete that project (Miller 
2014). This policy has been heavily criticised due to the fact that there are no sanctions for 
failing to complete the project, it is unlikely to meet Australia’s emissions reduction target 
of five per cent under 2000 levels by 2020, the marginal cost of abatement is much higher 
than under a tax or ETS, and that it requires the public to pay instead of the polluters 
(Denniss and Grudnoff 2011). Indeed, it has been described as akin to ‘giving money to 
an illegal drug dealer to stop dealing drugs, then having no penalty if he keeps selling 
them’ (White 2014). 
Prime Minister Abbott and the Coalition have espoused a variety of discourses justifying 
their NCPR, and criticising the policies of the former administration. This makes it 
difficult to isolate those that are dominant. For example, Abbott has ‘always thought that 
climate change was real’ (Abbott 2011a), but at the same time he is ‘hugely unconvinced 
by the so-called settled science on climate change’ (Australian Government Department 
of the Environment 2011). He has announced that the Coalition has ‘a policy to reduce 
emissions, not just to make them more expensive’ (Abbott 2011b), but at the same time 
has categorically said that ‘big reductions in emissions are impossible without a big 
increase in people’s cost of living’ (Taylor and Coorey 2011). However these 
contradictions are more revealing than they appear when one considers the historical 
utterances of the parties which comprise the Coalition. During their turn in the 
opposition, the Coalition politicians were very vocal in their scepticism of climate change. 
Abbott himself has been quoted as saying that ‘the argument [behind climate change] is 
absolute crap’ (Rintoul 2009), and a significant number of other Coalition members have 
espoused similar views. Former Senator Nick Minchin (Liberal) says that concern over 
global warming is ‘scaremongering’, disputes the fact that climate scientists are in 
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agreement as to the nature of climate change, and claims that Earth has not warmed since 
1998 (Minchin 2012). Minister for Employment Senator Eric Abetz (Liberal) has declared 
that worrying over climate change is the same as listening to the ‘apocalyptic Chicken 
Little’ (Abetz 2012). and that there ‘is no doubt that weeds pose… a challenge much 
clearer, more present and possibly more serious than… climate change’ (Carlton 2007). 
Self-avowed sceptic ‘of the connection between emissions and climate change’ (Pearse 
2011) and Minister for Industry Ian Macfarlane (Liberal) dismissed the content of Al 
Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth as ‘just entertainment’ (“Gore Says He Hasn’t Ruled out 
Running for President” 2006). Current Minister for Trade and Investment Andrew Robb 
(Liberal), who was responsible for developing a new emissions-trading portfolio, proudly 
‘dismissed climate change as a cause célèbre seized on by lefties with nothing to do since 
the collapse of communism’ (Pearse 2009, 51). And Minister for Agriculture Barnaby Joyce 
(Coalition) has accused ‘environmental goose-steppers’ and ‘doomsayers’ of silencing the 
voices of climate change deniers and has equated climate change with Y2K (“Climate 
Action Rises Above Hot Air” 2009). 
The point of outlining in such detail the sceptical discourses uttered by Abbott’s party 
while they were in the opposition is to juxtapose it with their current stance and their 
current policies. Such clear disbelief has been ostensibly replaced by tacit acceptance of 
anthropocentric climate change. By enumerating discourses as varied as climate 
scepticism to natural climate variability, the future of renewable energy but the 
importance of coal in the national economy, and by proclaiming the virtues of market 
forces yet criticising market-based emissions control in favour of direct intervention, it 
shows that the Coalition government has no clear vision for addressing climate change. 
Yet the fact that climate change is still being paid lip service and was a major election 
issues says something about the importance of climate change to the Australian populace. 
When one views the history of the Coalition’s discourse, it becomes clear why a 
government would seek to repeal an ETS but still try to court environmentally minded 
voters with the DAP: it allows the party to seem to be taking action on climate change yet 
allows it to adhere to its historically demonstrated preferences. In essence, the NCPR of 
the Coalition has been accompanied by a dramatic change in dominant discourses, 
notably a return to traditional economic perspectives and what appears to be cognitive 
dissonance regarding the strong alternative discourses uttered by the Liberal opposition 
during the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd administrations. 
5. Overview 
This above overview shows how the Australian government has characterised and 
framed the problems of global warming and climate change in tandem with the NCPR. A 
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visual overview of the dominant and alternative discourses inherent in the GLR can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Although dominance has shifted across discursive fields and between discourses, several 
observations can be made. First is the hegemony of the economic discursive field. In almost 
every year since global warming was acknowledged as a potential problem, the economic 
field has been dominant in the GLR. This has been true regardless of the types of policies 
present in the NCPR. In general, it does appear as though there is a correlation between 
sustainable economic discourses being used to justify more aggressive NCPRs, and 
traditional economic discourses seem to be used to criticise such policies. Despite this 
dichotomy, for every permutation of the NCPR, either the main justification or the main 
criticism has stemmed from the economic discursive field. This dominance may represent 
the strength of neoliberal economic ideals in Australia’s capitalist society, or perhaps it is 
indicative of the power of the aforementioned “greenhouse mafia”. But what it does 
represent is how significant the almighty dollar is, and highlights the lens through which 
policymakers view climate change. 
The scientific, the ethical, and the energy & technology fields also feature relatively 
prominently throughout the time period analysed. Discourses promoting the use of fossil 
fuels were significantly employed to justify a refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and have 
helped reinforce more dominant discourses of traditional economic growth. In terms of 
the scientific discursive field, the most frequently encountered discourses are those of 
climate change scepticism. Indeed, apart from the relatively brief period in the late 1980s 
when the scientific field was used to promote policies, scientific concerns have more often 
than not been used to criticise policies and legitimate inaction. This is quite a curious and 
unintuitive observation. This indicates the extent to which climate change has moved 
from a scientific issue to a political issue, and reinforces the notion that policy need not 
have any scientific basis. Lastly, ethics have been used both to legitimate and criticise 
policies. Curiously, notions of fellowship have been employed to suggest Australia 
should do more to reduce emissions, while in another era they meant that Australia 
should do less. 
Perhaps most curious is what has been marginalised, namely the impact discursive field. 
While there has been the occasional mention of the likely impacts of climate change, these 
discourses are clearly the most severely marginalised. This omission leads to interesting 
questions, most obviously counter-factual scenarios of how Australian climate policy 
would have progressed if the impacts of climate change were more acutely stressed. It 
might also help explain why Australia remains the developed country with the highest 
GHG emissions per capita: by neglecting the social impact discursive field in the GLR, 
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climate change has remained something of a vaporous, temporally distant concern, which 
might make people a bit uncomfortable. It is possible that if social impact discourses 
featured more prominently, this might be reflected by a change in per capita GHG 
emissions, as individuals seek to minimise the exposure to climate risk. However, as 
mentioned above that is a counter-factual scenario and remains conjecture. 
On balance, there has been some support for H1a. A correlation between sustainable 
economic discourses and “aggressive” NCPRs is visible, as is a correlation between 
traditional economic and fossil fuel discourses and “business as usual” policies. However, 
this is about as much support as H1a receives. Discourses of ethical fellowship have been 
used to promote greater action and have been used as a justification for refusal to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol. Anthropocentric climate change discourses were prevalent in 1987 
and 2007, yet the NCPR in each decade was markedly different. And narratives of 
different policy responses have been used to criticise, justify, defend and belittle many 
manifestations of NCPR. Despite the incoherence in the use of the GLR, one thread of 
consistency has emerged: the hegemony of the economic discursive field. This casts 
significant doubt on the accuracy of H1b, as narratives from the social impact field have 
rarely been employed, and scientific justifications have been of marginal importance at 
best. 
In the interests of brevity, only tiny excerpts of the discursive trends could be included 
above, however in the subsequent sections the GLR will be explored in greater depth and 
detail. What follows is an examination of how the GLR has responded in the wake of 
various stimuli, namely the economic downturns, natural disasters, national elections, 
and international climate negotiations. 
B .  R e c e s s i o n s  a n d  S l o w d o w n s  
This section examines how decreases in the Australian economy have influenced the 
Australian GLR. Two potential stimuli will be examined: recessions and economic 
slowdowns. Both of these concepts lack official definitions, however for the sake of 
parsimony the conventions endorsed by the International Monetary Fund will be 
employed.  A recession will be identified by a contraction of real GDP lasting for two or 
more consecutive quarters (Claessens and Ayhan Kose 2009, 52). A slowdown will 
employ the same timeframe of two consecutive quarters, but will use the less stringent 
criterion of a decreased growth rate when compared to the previous quarter. 
Using data sourced from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), one can see that there have been several economic slowdowns since 1987, but 
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only one full-blown recession which was in the early 1990s (see Figure 1). It is interesting 
to note that despite the global recession in 2007, the Australian economy only experienced 
a slump and continued to grow during that time. The grey shaded areas indicate economic 
slowdowns, and the orange shaded area highlights the recession of 1991. 
 
Figure 1: Quarterly Australian GDP Growth (Seasonally Adjusted), 1987–2014 (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2014). 
Comparing this data with the GLR trends outlined in Part A above (or the visual 
shorthand in Appendix B), one connection is immediately noticeable: Australia’s only 
recession in the past three decades is paired with a reversal of the dominant economic 
discourse, namely from a sustainable to a traditional perspective. The other noticeable 
observation is the lack of a correlation between the incidence of economic slowdowns and 
changes in the GLR. While undoubtedly a slowing economy was mentioned in context 
with action on climate change, these utterances were not prolific enough to substantiate a 
change in the dominant GLR discourses. Consequently it would be tenuous to claim that 
economic slowdowns have had a tangible effect on the GLR. Therefore, greater attention 
is justifiably paid to the effect of the 1990s recession. 
It is difficult to find direct evidence of the impact of the recession on the GLR. Only the 
social science equivalent of hearsay is readily available, which makes ascertaining causal 
relationships difficult. However it still provides a useful starting point. Looking at data 
from the national newspaper the Australian Financial Review ( Figure 2), one can see the 
marked shift in the dominant narrative of articles containing the phrases “climate change” 
or “global warming” in the early 1990s, correlating with the event of the recession. While 
it may be premature to assign anything other than a spurious relationship, it is interesting 
to note how the portrayal of climate change in the public news media changed from an 
issue of science to an issue of economics. While this is not definitive evidence of anything, 
it is at the very least an interesting coincidence, especially considering that during 1990–
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92 the Australian Government was exploring possible policy options regarding the 
implementation of the Toronto Targets. 
 
Figure 2: Dominant Narrative of Climate Change Articles in the Australian Financial Review, 1987–96 
(“The Australian Financial Review” 2014). 
As a consequence the Federal Government set up two major consultation processes: the 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) process and the Industry Commission 
(Bulkeley 2001b, 159). While overt mentions of ‘recession’ are interminably scarce in the 
reports and minutes of these processes, the language contained therein certainly 
emphasises the paramount importance of maintaining economic growth. For example, 
the goal of ESD should be ‘achieved without threat to continued economic growth’ 
(Downes 1996, 186), and the ‘primacy given to market liberalism and the need to 
incorporate environmental values into the framework of market economics’ was palpable 
(Ian 1992, 201). Nevertheless, the ESD working groups did determine that there were 
some options available to the government which would reduce emissions and save money 
(notably energy efficiency measures) (Hamilton 2001, 33). If the ESD could be said to 
straddle the border between traditional and sustainable environmental discourses, the 
Industry Commission was by contrast decidedly traditional. They relied on neo-classical 
economic thought and some rather generous assumptions about the perfection of the 
energy market (Bulkeley 2000, 43). It heavily emphasised the conflict between 
environmental and economic goals, and proselytised the importance of the latter 
(Industry Commission 1991). Consequently, it determined that if Australia were to take 
unilateral action to reduce GHG emissions, the costs would be economically deleterious 
and fiscally devastating. As a result, the business press ‘mounted a scare campaign against 
a carbon tax, one of the policy instruments mooted in the Industry Commission’s report’ 
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(Hamilton 2001, 33). Reinforced by the carbon lobby, the political willpower for carbon 
markets evaporated and that topic became political leprosy for the next decade. 
The ESD process and Industry Commission report were amalgamated into two policy 
documents: the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development and the 
National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS). The NGRS outlined a range of 
‘voluntary low- and no-cost emissions reduction measures for achieving a non-binding 
goal of stabilizing national CO2 emissions at 1988 levels by the year 2000 and reducing 
them by 20 per cent by 2005’ (Christoff 2005, 31). The voluntary measures were 
underpinned by the notion that the costs of inaction could not be economically estimated 
with a significant degree of certainty (due to the difficulty in assessing the monetary value 
of environmental factors for the economic models), and thus it was justifiable to delay 
prescribed action. Consequently, the NGRS was accepted by the Council of Australian 
Governments in 1992, and set the foundation for Australian climate policy for the years 
to come. Although it is difficult to ascribe the precise influence of the recession to the 
construction of the NGRS, its heavy focus on economic issues and the anathema of 
harming GDP growth suggests that the recession likely influenced the thinking of its 
creators. 
It is prudent to also mention the influence of the carbon lobby during this stage of policy 
formation. The 1990s recession may have acted as a force multiplier, exacerbating the 
carbon lobby’s response to the environmentally-minded Hawke government. The 
greenhouse lobby exerted significant influence to persuade the government ‘that 
emission-intensive industries made a much greater economic and employment 
contribution than was the case; that greenhouse constraints would wreck the entire 
Australian economy’ (Pearse 2009, 31–32). While this paper cannot recount the entire 
scope of the carbon lobby’s influence, it is plausible that the government was more 
receptive to their message than would have otherwise been the case, due to the poor 
health of the Australian economy at the time. Perhaps if the “greenhouse mafia” had not 
experienced the trauma of the recession, they may have been less militant about exerting 
their influence. However this is a counterfactual assumption, and cannot be asserted with 
a high degree of confidence. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated above the Australian recession of the early 1990s is 
associated with a reversal of the dominant discourse within the economic discursive field, 
namely from a sustainable to a traditional narrative. Curiously, the subsequent reversal 
from traditional to sustainable occurs at the same time as the GFC. Perhaps there is cause 
to investigate the role of a global recession, as opposed to a local recession, on the GLR. 
However as the Australian economy continued to grow during the GFC it is beyond the 
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scope of this paper to examine this potential linkage. Perhaps this can be explained by 
people being “fed-up” with the existing economic situation and politicians capitalising on 
their desire for change. However, while this is a plausible connection, it may be a spurious 
relationship: with a sample size of only two, it would be premature to ascribe permanence 
to this correlation. 
Circumstantial evidence also indicates the marginalisation of the scientific discursive field, 
presumably as short-term concerns of recovery trumped fanciful notions of future climate 
calamities. The recession had little effect on the energy & technology, ethical, legal & political 
or social impact fields, arguably as these fields were only of marginal importance to the 
GLR before the economic downturn. 
In summary, the evidence supports H2. The synthesised sources show how economic 
concerns were used to justify voluntary policies and the preservation of GDP above all 
else. These changes came at the expense of discussions regarding the science of climate 
change, and seem to have remained dominant ever since. 
C .  N a t u r a l  D i s a s t e r s  
According to the logic of rational choice and game theoretic models of climate change 
negotiations, one of the reasons why states consider free riding on taking climate action 
is that the negative effects lie in the future and are thus significantly discounted. However, 
recent reports from the IPCC and the USA National Climate Assessment stress that 
climate change is already magnifying the effects of natural disasters (Stocker et al. 2013; 
Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that in the wake 
of a natural disaster the GLR would shift, stimulating a change in the way climate policies 
are defended or criticised. This section of the thesis examines this assertion by looking at 
the major natural disasters to happen in Australia over the last 30 years, and how they 
have influenced the GLR. 
Based on the dichotomy established by Roberts and Parks, the focus herein is on ‘climate 
related disasters’. Created as an alternative scale to measure the human costs of climate 
change, they define such catastrophes as all disasters excluding ‘technological disasters, 
geophysical disasters, epidemics, forest and scrub fires, and famines’ (Roberts and Parks 
2007, 70). For the purposes of this thesis, no convincing argument can be made as to why 
epidemics, famines and especially fires should be excluded from the analysis. 
Consequently all catastrophic events which have occurred in Australia since 1987 have 
been synthesised, excluding technological (such as bridge collapses) and geophysical 
(such as earthquakes) disasters. Despite these restrictions, a ‘natural disaster’ remains a 
Climate Change in a Sunburnt Country  Abasi Latcham 
 
 
27 | 65 
relatively vague concept. Therefore for the sake of parsimony and continuity, data has 
been sourced from the Australian Attorney-General’s Department (Australian 
Government Attorney-General’s Department 2014a; Australian Government Attorney-
General’s Department 2014b; Commonwealth of Australia 2014), which is responsible for 
disaster management, with supplementary data sourced from the Australian Bureau of 
Meteorology (BoM) (Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology 2014a). This results 
in a total of 27 natural disasters afflicting Australia between 1987 and May 2014, including 
floods, cyclones, heatwaves, severe storms and bushfires. As climate change affects the 
intensity, not the frequency, of disasters, it is therefore prudent to focus the analysis on 
the most devastating and severe catastrophes. Examining the disasters on the bases of 
infrastructure damage and casualties (deaths, injuries and other “affected”) and selecting 
cases higher than two standard deviations from the means (that is, excluding 98% of all 
disasters, or a 2-sigma or greater event), leaves five significant disasters: the 1999 Sydney 
hailstorm, the 2009 South Australia & Victoria heatwave, the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the 
2011 Queensland floods, and Cyclone Yasi which hit Queensland in 2011. 
The first thing to notice from this list of disasters, which includes several extreme-weather 
record breakers, is that they are heavily clustered towards one end of the three decades 
analysed. Now while there is danger in blaming any one specific event on climate change 
(Arup 2011), it is arguable that the clustering of four of five high intensity natural disasters 
in a two year period might signify an alarming trend indicative of climate change 
manifestations. Nevertheless, as the text below indicates, the government discourse on 
climate change has remained largely unaffected by the incidence of catastrophic natural 
events. 
1. 1999 Sydney Hailstorm 
Discourse surrounding the 1999 Sydney hailstorm was largely devoid of climate change 
references. While the government was quick to acknowledge the severe intensity of the 
storm, the incredible size of the hailstones, and the unusual time of year for its occurrence 
(Yeo, Leigh, and Kuhne 1999), no politicians or government bodies mentioned the storm 
in context with either global warming or climate change. While not technically part of the 
governmental discourse, newspaper articles debunked claims qualifying the storm as a 
‘one-in-100-year-event’ or as ‘the mother of all storms’ (Keys 1999), instead categorising 
it as a ‘one-in-20 to -25 year event’ (Hogarth 1999). Perhaps the silence of the government 
amounts to an acquiescence of the media’s perspective, which might then be construed as 
increasing the salience of the climate scepticism discursive field. However this is a 
tenuous and disprovable claim, and should be considered accordingly. 
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That being said, 11 years after the event one (state) government document did mention 
the hailstorm in the context of climate change (Department of Environment, Climate 
Change and Water NSW 2010). This report covers multiple weather events and stresses 
that they ‘were not unprecedented’ (Department of Environment, Climate Change and 
Water NSW 2010, 5), and comes to the conclusion that more research is needed before any 
connections between increasing storm intensity and climate change can be drawn. This 
might indeed indicate the government’s acquiescence to increasing the salience of climate 
change sceptic discourses, although such a conclusion still seems slightly outlandish. 
On balance therefore, it appears as though the 1999 Sydney hailstorm—known as the 
costliest natural disaster in Australia’s history—passed by with nary a ripple on the GLR. 
2. 2009 South Australian & Victorian Heatwave 
Ten years after the Sydney hailstorm, south-eastern Australia was hit by the longest and 
hottest heatwave in recorded history. In January and February 2009, temperatures 
consistently stayed above the 40°C mark, with Adelaide and Melbourne setting records 
for the most consecutive days above 43°C, and much of South Australia and Victoria had 
maximum temperatures ‘12–15°C above normal’ (National Climate Centre 2009, 4). The 
heat buckled railway lines, caused power blackouts to over 10 000 homes, and forced the 
Australian Open tennis tournament to suspend matches due to hallucinating athletes 
(Perry 2009). 
Despite the new records, this heatwave also had little effect on the GLR. Although the 
Minister for Climate Change Penny Wong (ALP) stated that the heatwave was ‘consistent 
with climate change… and consistent with what scientists [said] would happen’ 
(“Heatwave a Sign of Climate Change: Wong” 2009), and the acting head of the National 
Climate Centre issued his agreement (Hunter 2009), these discourses were not widely 
mentioned in national media, nor was this incident discussed in parliament. Moreover, 
Wong qualified her remarks regarding the link between climate change and the heatwave, 
stating that ‘you have to look on a much longer time frame than week to week’ (Barbeler 
2009) before drawing any conclusions. 
Having examined what little evidence there is, it appears as though the heatwave also 
had little effect on the GLR.  
3. 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
The month following the heatwave, the same region was engulfed by flames, marking 
‘the worst bushfires in [Australia’s] history’ (ABC 2009). Although PM Gillard and 
Opposition Leader Turnbull delivered eloquent speeches to parliament conveying 
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sympathy, praising the resolve, tenacity and strength of will of those affected and ending 
on notes of positivity emphasising how “we will rebuild”, neither politician mentioned 
climate change explicitly or implicitly in the context of preparing for repeat occurrences 
(Gillard and Turnbull 2009). However, Representative Kelvin Thomson (ALP) declared 
that ‘the bushfires in Victoria… [and] the floods and storms in North Queensland… are 
all part of the same phenomenon—global warming, climate change’ (Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates 2009a, 826). Moreover, Representative Tony Zappia (ALP) stated 
that one ‘need only look at the economic costs of the Australian drought, the Victorian 
bushfires and the Queensland floods… to understand that… climate change cannot 
simply be dismissed’ (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2009b, 1549). Despite these 
statements promoting discourses of domestic impacts, their relatively low volume meant 
that they did not have a significant impact on the GLR. 
Several months after the inferno, more discourses concerning the bushfires and climate 
change were uttered. The Royal Commission released by the Victorian government 
mentioned the phrase “climate change” twice, both in the context of increasing domestic 
risks.(Teague, McLeod, and Pascoe 2010). Discussions in parliament also explored the 
connection, with Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts Peter Garrett (ALP) 
declaring that ‘fire regimes in southern Australia… have been changing’, and those 
changes are ‘consistent with climate change impacts’ (Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates 2009d, 10873). Federal Attorney-General Robert McClelland (ALP) outlined how 
emergency services will: 
take full advantage of the lessons learned from the tragedy of the Victorian bushfires to 
maintain an efficient and responsive disaster response and recovery framework for the 
future, which, unfortunately, all indications will become more in demand as a result of the 
impacts of climate change (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2009c, 8675). 
Again however, these whispers promoting the social impact discursive field were not 
absorbed into the GLR. Notably however, several months after the heatwave dissipated 
and the smouldering subsided, then-Opposition Leader Tony Abbot questioned the link 
between the high temperatures and climate change by stating that ‘the world’s warming 
has stopped’ (AAP 2010a). This statement stands in stark contrast to the others mentioned, 
yet is consistent with the Coalition and their preferred discourse of climate change science 
scepticism. Nevertheless, this statement also had a negligible effect on the GLR. 
4. 2011 Queensland Floods 
In Queensland in early 2011 an area the size of France and Germany combined was 
declared a disaster zone because of flooding from torrential rains (which came on the back 
of a decade long drought affecting large parts of the state) (Queensland Government 
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2011). Although the global scientific community suggested links between these floods and 
climate change, government discourse was mixed with respect to accepting this 
connection (Birsel 2011; Readfearn 2011). In Parliament, Representative John Murphy 
(ALP) sardonically thanked climate change deniers for the lingering ‘public confusion 
[that] still surrounds the origins of what has become a destructive national and 
international crisis of catastrophic floods, storms, heatwaves, fires and cyclones’ 
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2011c, 850). He went on to qualify his grievances: 
I want to make it clear tonight that climatologists and other scientists are not saying that 
global warming is directly driving events, in particular Cyclone Yasi or the floods in South-
East Queensland and north-west Victoria, nor the recent disastrous Victorian and Western 
Australian bushfires or the other climate calamities in other parts of the world. Rather 
climatologists and other scientists are warning that the probability of these sorts of events 
is increased by rising air and sea temperatures and that these increasing temperatures are 
being driven by the trapping of heat by rising atmospheric carbon dioxide levels 
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2011c, 850). 
These strong discourses emphasising the scientific and social impact discursive fields were 
echoed by Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Dr Mike Kelly 
(ALP), and Representatives Adam Bandt (Greens) and Steve Gibbons (ALP). Dr Kelly 
brought home the notion that ‘we [Australia] may experience not only further events… 
but also events of greater intensity, with the probable effects of climate change’ 
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2011b, 173). Bandt hypothesised that ‘we have 
been given a glimpse into the future we face if we do not act to cut pollution and prevent 
further climate change’, and attempted to marginalise climate change sceptic discourses 
by denigrating the ‘loud and partisan voices [that] in recent weeks have tried to shout 
down any discussion about climate change and the floods’ (Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates 2011a, 65). Gibbons also emphasised the domestic impact of 
climate change, but espoused a degree of scepticism by stating that ‘bushfires, cyclones, 
storms, drought[s] and flood[s]… are expected to increase in frequency and intensity due 
to climate change, whatever the cause of that change may be’ (Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates 2011a, 46). 
By contrast however, Representative Michael McCormack (Coalition) categorically 
declared that ‘the events of recent times show again the ageless cycle of nature, floods 
following droughts. This is not climate change’ (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 
2011b, 183). Moreover, when asked if she thought climate change had anything to do with 
the floods, PM Gillard offered her support for the cautious perspective, stating that ‘I don't 
think you can look at one weather event, one disaster. I mean this has been a huge, 
unprecedented disaster but I don't think you can look at… a bit of the weather and say 
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that equals climate change. I don't think it's as simple as that’ (Kirk 2011). This strong 
discourse of natural climate variability appears to have been taken up by the Queensland 
Government in their Commission of Inquiry into the inundation. Indeed, of the 650 pages 
of the Royal Commission investigating the floods, the phrase “climate change” can be 
found only 19 times. Seven utterances are in one seven-line paragraph, which arrives at 
the conclusion that the ‘analysis should be completed first without taking into account 
climate change’ (Queensland Government 2012, 45). The remaining 12 mentions are in the 
context of statutory immunity for the liability of local councils (Queensland Government 
2012, 128–136). 
This flood of biblical proportions did not have a clear impact on the dominant climate 
discourses. Although there are several examples of statements promoting the social impact 
discursive field, there are also statements dismissing these as hyperbolae. And the 
decision to omit climate change from the official Commission of Inquiry also acts to 
counterbalance discourses advocating domestic repercussions. 
5. 2011 Cyclone Yasi 
The most recent major disaster analysed is Cyclone Yasi: the 600km-wide, category 5 
cyclone with 295km per hour winds and 9m high waves, whose path coincided with 
homes of some 400 000 people, that made landfall in north Queensland in February 2011 
(Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology 2014b). Here one finds the strongest 
associations linking climate change and the catastrophe. The deputy leader of the Greens 
party Christine Milne said outright that Yasi’s devastation was ‘a tragedy of climate 
change’ (“TC Yasi Caused by Climate Change: Greens” 2011). However, as is common in 
Australian politics, the voices of the Greens party remained largely marginalised, thus 
their bold assertion did not significantly influence the CDC.  
The position of the Greens was challenged by the BoM, with its High Impact Weather 
Research team stating that ‘events like Yasi are just an extreme part of normal weather 
patterns… [We cannot] link Cyclone Yasi to climate change’ (Gary 2011), and noting that 
‘it is difficult to make a strong case that we are seeing a change in tropical cyclones [due 
to climate change]’.(Lloyd and Fraser 2011). CSIRO agreed, reiterating that ‘no individual 
event could be linked to climate change’, but that climate change would increase the 
probability of extreme events (Smith 2011). This position was echoed by the Federal 
Government’s climate change advisor Ross Garnaut, who agreed that Yasi could not be 
entirely ascribed to climate change, but warned that climate change ‘can intensify extreme 
events, and… we’re [Australia] feeling some of that today’ (AAP 2011a), and told the 
people of Australia that they ‘ain’t [sic] seen nothing yet’ (Morton 2011). 
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The statement by Representative Murphy (quoted above in relation to the Queensland 
floods) was also spurred by Yasi, which pressed home discourses of the domestic impact 
of climate change. Representative Melissa Park (ALP) also took the opportunity Yasi 
presented to promote social impact discourses: 
In Australia [the] imperative [to respond to climate change and its consequences] is made 
stronger by the fact that we are in many ways particularly susceptible to the negative 
effects of climate change. The evidence and the expert analysis do suggest that climate 
change will produce extreme weather events of greater intensity. While no-one can say 
that the clearing and burning of a particular forest in South America in the year 1987 has 
directly contributed to Cyclone Yasi or the floods in Queensland or the fires last year in 
Victoria, it is absolutely correct to say that all of the human contributions to climate change 
are, taken together, a factor in bringing about an altered climate system that will result in 
higher temperatures, higher sea levels and more intense extreme weather events 
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2011b, 358). 
Finally, Senator Douglas Cameron (ALP) criticised climate change sceptic discourses, 
declaring climate change deniers to be ‘the great pretenders on climate change’ and that 
they ‘try to pretend… that there were no disasters in Australia—no floods, no Cyclone 
Yasi’ (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2011d, 2319). While it is doubtful that any 
individual could deny the existence of a storm the size of the continental USA, the 
exasperation and frustration inherent in Senator Cameron’s remark was not an isolated 
discourse. In the wake of Yasi, prominent academics criticised the unwillingness of ‘most 
of our [Australia’s] politicians and most of our major media outlets’ to make a connection 
between climate change and the hostile environment, calling it a ‘toxic blend of denial, 
media management and sheer lack of leadership’ (Fogarty 2011), and implored ‘the 
spoilers to stop playing culture war games and focus on the most-cost effective ways of 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions’ (Quiggan 2011). 
Again, it is difficult to isolate a specific impact on the GLR due to the disaster. Although 
there were attempts to increase the dominance of domestic impact discourses, there were 
equally loud attempts to promote climate change scepticism. When one considers the 
relative weight of each utterance, and the medium in which they were transmitted, it 
appears as though the strongest message portrayed would have been one of caution and 
reluctance to associate Yasi with climate change. 
6. Overview 
In summary, despite some private sources claiming that Australian disasters have 
spurred discussion of climate change (Marriott 2013), the government discourse does not 
reflect this trend. And if it has spurred discussion, the influence of the Murdoch media 
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empire on both news periodicals (Manne 2011) and broadcast television (Chubb and Nash 
2012) has increased the influence of alternative discourses such as climate science 
scepticism. In the interests of creating a ‘balanced discussion’ (Simons 2011; S. Keane 2012) 
Australian media outlets give equal weight to anthropocentric and dissenting viewpoints. 
Although this thesis lacks the purview to investigate the nature of climate change 
reporting, this phenomenon might offer some explanation as to why natural disasters 
have had negligible effects on the GLR.  
Consequently, there is a little evidence to support Hypothesis 3. The occurrence of natural 
disasters has not had a clear effect on the GLR, let alone the impact discursive field. 
Although the Greens party made claims that climate change will result in ‘significant 
increase[s] in natural disasters’ (The Greens 2014), these claims did not achieve dominance 
in the governmental discourse, and they are not accepted by the scientific community (as 
climate change increases the intensity, not frequency, of disasters). Perhaps the most 
significant effect on the GLR of these severe disasters was to increase the salience of 
climate change sceptic discourses. Even though the basis for Environment Minister Greg 
Hunt’s (Liberal) rejection of the links between bushfires and climate change was because 
he ‘looked up what Wikipedia says’ (Davidson 2013), his dismissal reinforced the 
Coalition’s alternative discourse of climate scepticism. One would hope that a minister 
for the environment who is savvy enough to use Wikipedia would also be aware of the 
2007 IPCC report declaring that:  
Climate change is known to alter the likelihood of increased wildfire sizes and 
frequencies… while also inducing stress on trees that indirectly exacerbate [such] 
disturbances… This suggests an increasing likelihood of more prevalent fire disturbances, 
as has recently been observed… (Parry et al. 2007, 229). 
Alternatively, the lack of impact on the GLR could potentially be explained by the fact 
that floods, cyclones, droughts, bushfires and storms are all relatively normal in Australia. 
As mentioned above, ascribing any one event to climate change is fraught with risk, and 
identifying changing trends in a country where a drought can last for over a decade only 
to be replaced by torrential rains is difficult. Perhaps if unusual weather events begin to 
occur, such as tornados or snow storms, the GLR might respond. However as it stands 
now, natural disasters have had a very weak effect on the legitimation of Australian 
climate change policies. 
D .  E l e c t i o n  C a m p a i g n s  
Despite a brief period of bipartisanship, climate change and global warming have been 
partisan issues in Australian politics since the early 1990s (Staples 2009). This section 
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examines how the GLR is shaped by the occurrence of federal elections. Election 
campaigns provide political parties near-perfect platforms from which to frame their 
perspectives and differentiate themselves from other contenders. Therefore what is 
expected is that the salience of marginalised discourses increases around the event of an 
election. The table below outlines the dates of elections for the lower house of the 
Australian parliament (the House of Representatives) for the relevant period of analysis. 
The subsequent Prime Ministers have been emboldened. 
Election Date  Labor Leader Coalition Leader 
    
11 Jul 1987  Bob Hawke John Howard 
24 Mar 1990  Bob Hawke Andrew Peacock 
13 Mar 1993  Paul Keating Robert Hewson 
2 Mar 1996  Paul Keating John Howard 
3 Oct 1998  Kim Beazley John Howard 
10 Nov 2001  Kim Beazley John Howard 
9 Oct 2004  Mark Latham John Howard 
24 Nov 2007  Kevin Rudd John Howard 
21 Aug 2010  Julia Gillard Tony Abbott 
7 Sep 2013  Kevin Rudd Tony Abbott 
Table 2: House of Representatives Elections (The University of Western Australia 2013). 
1. Before 2001 
After reviewing campaign platforms, policy statements and election speeches 
surrounding these ten elections, the first conclusion to be drawn is that before 2001, global 
warming or climate change policy barely warranted a mention in the main parties’ 
election campaigns. This observation is reinforced by data from the Australian Election 
Study outlining the most important non-economic issues for sampled voters in most 
recent elections (see Figure 3). One can see that “global warming” was only worthy of 
inclusion as an option from 2007, and that “environment” has routinely been dramatically 
trumped by concerns over healthcare. Perhaps it is not surprising then that the election 
campaigns in these earlier elections dwell heavily on health reform and fail to mention 
carbon or GHGs at all. This observation does little to provide general support for 
Hypothesis 4, however the situation is slightly different after the turn of the century. 
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Figure 3: Most Important Non-Economic Issues in Australian Federal Elections.(McAllister and Cameron 
2014, 21) 
2. 2001 & 2004 
John Howard’s administration did not campaign on climate change policy. This is 
evidenced by the continuous and consistent supremacy of the traditional economic 
discourse and the fossil fuel discourse. This denigration of climate policy was 
(unsuccessfully) capitalised upon by Howard’s Labor opponents in the 2001 and 2004 
elections, Mark Latham and Kim Beazley respectively. The election speeches made by 
each leader act as microcosms of their discourses. While Howard’s speeches before the 
2001 and 2004 elections do not mention climate change, global warming, renewable 
energy or greenhouse gases, both Latham’s and Beazley’s do. In 2001 Latham equated 
addressing climate change to ‘saving our planet’ and emphasised the role Australia must 
play on the global stage (Latham 2004). He brought the issue home by outlining the effects 
on the Australian environment. He promised to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and to join the 
‘lucrative international trade in carbon emissions’ (Latham 2004). And Latham saw the 
future developing along a sustainable path with a greater contribution stemming from 
renewable energy. Consequently, this platform is mirrored by changes in economic, ethical, 
political & legal and social impact discursive fields. In a similar vein, Beazley saw ‘enormous 
opportunities’ for Australia in the environmental sustainability industry, and intended to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Beazley 2001). This corresponds with changes in the GLR 
regarding discourses on sustainable economic thought and international agreements. 
While these two election campaigns do correspond with changes to the GLR, these 
changes were only temporary. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact nature for the 
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brevity of these changes, it seems plausible that as climate change was only an auxiliary 
component of these parties’ election platforms, and the main election battles were fought 
over economic and medical concerns, and changes to the GLR never had enough time to 
gather traction. However, this changed in the lead up to the 2007 election, as former PM 
John Howard declared: ‘in 2006 my Government hit a “perfect storm” on the issue [of 
climate change]… To put it bluntly “doing something” about global warming gathered 
strong political momentum in Australia’ (Howard 2013, 5). Consequently, the elections of 
2007, 2010 and 2013 have all seen more lasting changes in the GLR. 
3. 2007 
For the first time in 11 years in power, Howard’s election speech mentioned climate 
change, emphasising that action needs to be taken ‘in a way that does not destroy jobs,’ 
that ‘does not weaken the great coal industry,’ and ‘ensures importantly that all nations 
of the world pull their weight and play their part’ (Howard 2007). It is clear that this 
reflects the previous years’ dominant discourses of traditional economic thought, fossil 
fuels and international fellowship.  
By contrast, the election platform of the ALP and Kevin Rudd brought about changes in 
the GLR due to their heavy campaigning on climate change and the strong alternative 
discourses associated with it. Campaigning on commitments to: ratify the Kyoto Protocol; 
voluntarily reduce emissions by 60%; establish a national ETS; increase the RET; 
implement climate change adaptation policies; and, make Australia ‘a leader in the global 
negotiations on climate change’ (Rudd 2007a), all the while criticising the Howard 
administration’s denial of climate change, Rudd and the ALP upset the status quo and 
increased the dominance of many erstwhile marginalised discourses. Rudd managed to 
paint the ALP as ‘the party of climate reform, the party that was willing to take climate 
change seriously and make bold decisions’ (Macintosh, Wilkinson, and Denniss 2010). 
Rudd’s determination to ‘forge a national consensus on climate change’ and broad policy 
ambitions resonated throughout several discursive fields (Kelly 2007). In addition to the 
specific policies themselves increasing the political/legal field, and the moral undertones 
increasing the salience of the ethical field, sustainable economic discourses were at the 
forefront of the ALP’s campaign. Viewing the challenge as one of ‘economic restructuring’ 
and the application of a ‘market-based strategy’ (Kelly 2007), the economic discursive field 
remained at the forefront, however with a narrative of sustainability instead of traditional 
extraction and consumption. 
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4. 2010 
This situation repeated itself in 2010, however this election marked the rising significance 
of the Greens party. Whereas in earlier elections the Greens had never secured more than 
a nominal share of the electorate, in the 2010 election their vote jumped from 3.6% to 11.4% 
(Hepburn 2010). This diversion away from the two main parties is indicative of the lack 
of media attention given to the main parties’ climate change policies in this election, and 
the lack of differentiation between their climate policies. Gillard’s election speech was 
notably vague about climate change, only aspiring to ‘work together and tackle the 
challenge of climate change’ (Gillard 2010b). This was likely an attempt at misdirection, 
stemming from the ALP’s dissonant climate change platform. The ALP did not run on a 
coherent climate action platform, first trying to distance itself from Rudd’s attempted 
introduction of a fixed-price ETS by paradoxically declaring ‘there will be no carbon tax 
under a government I lead, but let me be clear: I will be putting a price on carbon and I 
will move to an emissions trading scheme’ (Walsh 2013), and then later introducing the 
negatively-received “citizens’ assembly” policy which would have seen ‘150 randomly-
selected Australians’ (AAP 2010b) gathered ‘to examine over 12 months the evidence on 
climate change, the case for action and the possible consequences of introducing a market-
based approach to limiting and reducing carbon emissions’ (Gillard 2010a). Despite these 
changes in policy direction, the ALP did not deviate radically from the underlying 
discourses espoused during the Rudd administration.  
The election platform of the Coalition under Tony Abbott capitalised on the discourses 
marginalised by the ALP. Apart from the expected heavy criticising of the ALP’s policies, 
the Coalition campaigned to never ‘damage our economy with futile gestures’ such as a 
carbon market that would ‘raise prices, damage industries and cost jobs’, but instead to 
‘buy abatements, particularly through soil improvements and tree planting’ (Abbott 
2010). These statements typify the traditional economic discourse that was prevalent in 
the Liberal Party’s campaign, which stood in stark contrast to the sustainable economic 
discourse presented by the ALP. Curiously, this was diametrically opposed to the 
Coalition’s preferred discourse from only one year earlier, where Tony Abbott declared 
his scepticism by stating that ‘we can’t conclusively say whether man-made carbon 
dioxide emissions are contributing to climate change’, and even declared support for 
carbon markets by enunciating that ‘if Australia is greatly to reduce its carbon emissions, 
the price of carbon intensive products should rise… [A carbon] tax would be the 
intelligent skeptic’s [sic] way to deal with minimising emissions’ (B. Keane 2011). In the 
interests of uniformity however, official party copies of these speeches have been erased 
from history by the Liberal Party with all of Abbott’s speeches and media statements 
made before July 2010 having disappeared, and ‘at least two recent transcripts have also 
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been expunged from the public record’ (Hall 2013). While copies do exist on the National 
Library of Australia’s PANDORA archive, the deleterious move by the Coalition appears 
to be a clear example of discourse management. It seems very clear that statements and 
policies which were inconsistent with the party’s currently preferred discourses have 
been removed. This makes it difficult in retrospect to identify the dominant discourses at 
the time. What is clear however, is that attempts have been made to promote the 
traditional economic discourse, and marginalise the previously espoused discourses of 
carbon markets and science scepticism. 
5. 2013  
The Coalition’s endeavour to distance itself from its erstwhile support of a carbon market 
continued in the 2013 election. Their climate catchphrase became “axe the tax”, and the 
repeal of the carbon pricing legislation became one of their central election platforms 
(Readfearn 2013). So fundamental was the marginalisation of the carbon market discourse 
to the Liberal Party campaign that in the week before the 2013 election Abbott equated 
the vote to a ‘referendum on the carbon tax’ (Hull 2013). Furthermore, their official climate 
policy media release also sought to marginalise the carbon market discourse by stating 
that a ‘vote for Labor or the Greens will mean ever increasing financial pain for no 
environmental gain,’ but did little to promote alternatives other than stating that ‘the 
environment will have an important place on the agenda’ (G. Hunt 2013). Traditional 
economic discourses remained the cornerstone of Abbott’s campaign, insinuating that 
‘we’ll build a stronger economy [by] scrapping the carbon tax’ (Abbott 2013), and end 
‘unnecessary’ climate change-related administrative bodies (S. Clarke and Greene 2013). 
Labor took a much broader approach, and sought to increase the salience of the ethical 
and social impact fields by reminding the populace that ‘the serious reality of climate 
change and its impacts on our environment is one [sic] of the key challenges facing 
Australia’ and that ‘we [Australians] have a responsibility to reduce our pollution output’ 
and should ‘join countries like Germany, France, the UK [United Kingdom]… China, 
South Korea and parts of the United States’ in an international ETS (Butler 2013). Rudd 
promoted ‘a clean energy future’ and promoted sustainable economic perceptions, 
renewable energy discourses and emissions reductions targets (Rudd 2013). 
What is evident is the omission of scientific discourses from both major parties. Only the 
Greens incorporated science into their platform, as exemplified by their official policy 
release which reiterated the warnings of The Climate Commission regarding emissions 
levels and global tipping points, as well as supporting a carbon market and renewable 
energy investment (Milne 2013). This marginalisation of the scientific field sheds 
interesting light on just how politicised the issue of climate change has become. It 
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reinforces the primacy of the economic field, as it becomes clear that the major parties 
advocated policies based on economic costs and benefits, as opposed to scientific 
consensus or the imperatives of taking swift action. 
6. Overview 
Overall, there seems to be substantial support for H4, namely the increasing salience of 
marginalised discourses surrounding the event of an election. Stronger evidence is seen 
in the elections over the past decade, as before then climate change had not been a highly 
salient voter issue. Without a doubt, the economic discursive field has received the most 
attention during the elections, with the general trend being that the ALP try to promote 
discourses of sustainable economies, whereas the Coalition praises traditional economic 
models. Silenced discourses in the scientific and social impact fields also increased in 
salience around elections, however not as frequently or dramatically as the economic. The 
focus on economic narratives and the relative marginalisation of science suggests, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, that political parties campaign on the basis of what will get them 
elected, and not what is arguably necessary for the collective good. 
The examples clearly show that national elections have a significant effect on the GLR and 
consequently on how climate change policies are justified, or perhaps more importantly, 
criticised. The logic underpinning H4 is that opposition political parties will capitalise on 
marginalised discourses in order to differentiate themselves from the incumbents. 
Perhaps in a society where climate change policy was not as dichotomised as in Australia, 
there would be less support for H4. However, due to the partisanship in Australian 
climate politics, action on climate change has become yet another political issue, like the 
age of retirement, the corporate tax rate, or the treatment of illegal immigrants.  
E .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C l i m a t e  N e g o t i a t i o n s  
The final driver of the GLR to be examined is the role of international climate negotiations. 
Due to the global nature and high publicity of these conferences, it is hypothesised that 
their occurrence will drive increases in the significance of the ethical discursive field. In 
particular, this section examines the influence of the sessions of the UNFCCC Conference 
of Parties (COP), due to their regularity, wide attendance, and varied success rate. 
Year COP Meeting  Location Australian Prime Minister 
     
1995 1  Berlin, Germany Paul Keating 
1996 2  Geneva, Switzerland John Howard 
1997 3  Kyoto, Japan John Howard 
1998 4  Buenos Aires, Argentina John Howard 
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1999 5  Bonn, Germany John Howard 
2000 6  The Hague, Netherlands John Howard 
2001 6 bis  Bonn, Germany John Howard 
2001 7  Marrakech, Morocco John Howard 
2002 8  New Delhi, India John Howard 
2003 9  Milan, Italy John Howard 
2004 10  Buenos Aires, Argentina John Howard 
2005 11  Montreal, Canada John Howard 
2006 12  Nairobi, Kenya John Howard 
2007 13  Bali, Indonesia Kevin Rudd 
2008 14  Poznań, Poland Kevin Rudd 
2009 15  Copenhagen, Denmark Kevin Rudd 
2010 16  Cancún, Mexico Julia Gillard 
2011 17  Durban South Africa Julia Gillard 
2012 18  Doha, Qatar Julia Gillard 
2013 19  Warsaw, Poland Tony Abbott 
Table 3: Sessions of the UNFCCC-COP (UNFCCC 2014). 
1. Before Kyoto (COP-1–3) 
The Australian position at the early COPs was characterised by strong discourses against 
unilateral action by developed countries, against uniform international targets, and 
trumpeting the importance of traditional economic thought (Grubb, Vrolijk, and Brack 
1999, 50; Paterson 1996, 70). As mentioned above, Australia’s position was closely wed to 
the continued use of fossil fuels, which in turn translated to opposition to binding 
reduction targets. A joint statement issued by the Coalition’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Minister for the Environment and the Minister for Resources and Energy is emblematic 
of the official discourse from this period:  
Australia will insist that the outcome of current international negotiations on climate 
change safeguards Australia's particular economic and trade interests... The Government 
will be actively campaigning to ensure that all countries bear their fair share of the global 
burden of addressing climate change (Callick 1996). 
This joint statement is reinforced by announcements made by then-Environment Minister 
Robert Hill (Liberal) about Australia’s greenhouse policy. Hill promoted the fact that 
Australia will ‘look for measures whereby we can meet our international responsibility 
whilst at the same time maintaining our capacity to grow as an economy’ (AAP 1996), and 
that climate science did ‘not provide sufficient certainty about climate change, nor about 
the assessment of impacts’ (McCathie and Callick 1996). In the lead up to the Kyoto 
Protocol, Prime Minister Howard criticised other countries which supported tough GHG 
reduction targets, announcing that he was ‘disappointed’ with those countries who were 
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only ‘looking after their own national interests’ (Reuters News 1996b), and that their 
behaviour ‘hurts Australia’ (Benson 1996). 
These discursive trends dovetailed during the Kyoto COP, where Australia emphasised 
“fairness” in reduction targets and the necessity of fossil fuels. Prime Minister Howard 
campaigned for an outcome that was ‘balanced and fair’ (Howard 1997), but which 
translated as special treatment for Australia. Supported by a report from the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (which was sponsored by 
the fossil fuel industry) (Hamilton 2001, 58), the Foreign Minister claimed that common 
reduction targets ‘would make Australia's economy suffer more than any other OECD 
country’ and that ‘tens of thousands of jobs would be lost’ (Hamilton 2001, 61), and the 
PM repeated that such targets would ‘do very serious damage to the Australian economy’ 
(Kelly 1997a). Although the actual report stated that halving Australia’s emissions by 2050 
would result in GDP growing 247% instead of 281%, the narrative repeated by the PM 
and cabinet was that reducing emissions would ‘lead to a 10 per cent fall in GDP’ (Pearse 
2009, 23). Furthermore these strong traditional economic discourses were echoed in 
Murdoch’s media. The Australian people were told that ‘the Kyoto meeting is not just 
about the environment. It is about imposition of restrictions across economies, most 
notably Australia's’ (Kelly 1997a). 
The outcome of the Kyoto COP was the Kyoto Protocol, which Senator Hill claimed as a 
‘victory for Australian diplomacy and… John Howard’, and PM Howard declared as a 
‘splendid result, particularly gratifying for Australia’ (Taylor 1997), which would ‘protect 
local jobs while improving the world environment’ (Lunn and Garran 1997a). Even the 
populist media announced it as ‘win-win’, praised the ‘tenacity’, ‘guts and persistence’ of 
the Australian delegation, and managed to belittle the European ‘grandstanding’ for 
stricter targets (Kelly 1997b). The reason for the incumbent Coalition’s celebration was 
that under the Kyoto Protocol, Australia was one of only three developed countries 
(including Norway and Iceland) which were allowed to increase its emissions. Moreover, 
the special “Australia clause” enabled Australia to include emissions released due to land 
clearing in its baseline calculations. This meant that Australia could stop clearing land 
(which it had done since 1990) and essentially meet its Kyoto targets. Senator Hill played 
a game of brinkmanship, and refused to concur with the agreement until such a clause 
had been inserted (Lunn and Garran 1997b). This move was criticised by the European 
Union and environmental non-governmental organisations, and made Australia a climate 
pariah (Skelton 1997). Nevertheless, it clearly demonstrates the dogmatism to which the 
Howard administration clung to the discourses of traditional economics and how talk of 
international good faith in addressing climate change was little more that political lip 
service (Hamilton 1997). 
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2. Post-Kyoto (COP-4–12) 
Although the formation of the Kyoto Protocol makes a convenient sub-heading, it did 
little to mark a change in discourse dominance. Over the following years Australia 
reiterated its traditional economic narrative and reluctance to act without commitments 
from developing countries. In 2000, after emphasising the ‘constructive role’ of Australia, 
and how it would contribute ‘its fair share’ at the COP (Hill 2000a), Senator Hill left the 
conference when negotiations were turning in a direction that was not ‘fair to our 
[Australia’s] economy’ (Hill 2000b). Hill’s intransigence led to the first and only 
postponement of a COP decision, the six-month delayed outcome being another 
concession for Australian industry. Unsurprisingly, Hill’s constituents lauded the result 
as a ‘very good outcome’ for Australia and its economy, and championed the traditional 
economic discourses (Salleh 2001). 
Narratives outlining international “fairness” persisted too, especially in the context of 
ratification. Senator Hill stated that ratification would depend on ‘whether the big 
emitters in the developing world, the Chinas [sic] and the Indias [sic], come on board’ 
(AAP 1998). Hill’s eventual replacement, Senator Ian Campbell (Liberal), repeated that an 
‘effective response to climate change requires action from all major greenhouse gas 
emitting countries’ (Campbell 2005), that there must be a ‘new global agreement that 
involves all major emitters… that fits the… economic aspirations of all countries’ 
(Campbell 2006), and that we need ‘to find international responses that are 
environmentally effective, economically efficient and involve all major emitters, [and that] 
[a]bove all… safeguards world economic growth and development’ (Campbell 2004). 
Underwriting this facade of fairness was the discourse of a traditional, fossil fuel powered 
economy, and fears of losing a competitive advantage because of emissions targets. These 
messages demanding fairness, but praising Australia’s special treatment, seeking 
emissions reductions, but relying on carbon fuels, were often contradictory. Eventually, 
the traditional economic discourse emerged supreme, with PM Howard qualifying the 
Kyoto Protocol as ‘next to useless and indeed harmful’ for Australia until ‘such time as 
the major polluters of the world, including the United States and China, are made part of 
the Kyoto regime’ (AAP 2005). A curious declaration when juxtaposed with the salubrious 
victory speeches surrounding the ‘splendid result’ of the Kyoto Protocol’s formation. 
3. Post-Howard (COP-13–19) 
COP-13 in Bali was the first conference after the change from Howard’s to Rudd’s 
government. A noticeable change in discourse was evident within the first few days of 
the new administration, as Rudd’s first act of government was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
and name climate change as ‘one of the greatest moral, economic and environmental 
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challenges of our age’ (Rudd 2007b). Ratification was associated with strong discourses 
emphasising the impact of climate change, noting that Australia’s ‘rivers are dying’, its 
‘bushfires are becoming more ferocious’ and its natural wonder is ‘now at risk’ (Rudd 
2007b). A change in the ethical field is also notable, with Australia’s role shifting from 
“doing its fair share” to ‘working hard to build bridges between nations’ (Rudd 2007b). 
Furthermore, climate science scepticism was dismissed, with the PM declaring 
anthropocentric climate change to be ‘indisputable’ (AAP 2009b), and the perception of 
national interest was reversed—whereas several years earlier an ETS would ravage the 
Australian economy, now, according Environmental Minister Greg Combet (ALP), such 
a policy was ‘firmly in our national interest’ (Millar 2010). 
Interestingly, alternative discourses began to increase in salience following COP-16. 
Although there were some mentions of disagreement and criticism from the opposition 
through the 1990s and early 2000s, discourses challenging the main narrative began in 
earnest in 2009. Following the Copenhagen conference, characterised as a ‘grand bargain’ 
by PM Rudd (AAP 2009b), and thus promoting a discourse of international agreements, 
opposition leader Tony Abbott equated the conference to an ‘environmental Munich 
agreement’ (“Abbott Compares Copenhagen to Munich Agreement” 2009), or ‘a PR 
[public relations] stunt at best’ (AAP 2009a). What is more, the discourse of leadership 
was challenged by the opposition, declaring it to be ‘a great conceit to think that Australia 
could save the world on its own’ (AAP 2009c). Furthermore, a traditional economic 
perspective re-emerged in response to discussions of emissions reductions—Abbott 
announced that a 15 or 25 per cent reduction in emissions would result in a ‘$300 or $400 
billion tax’ on the people of Australia, and that the ‘Australian people ought to be very 
concerned’ about international agreements (AAP 2009a). These strong and emotionally 
charged alternative discourses resonated well with the dominant discourses of the 1990s, 
and acted as an effective competitor to the discourses uttered by the incumbent 
government. 
By the time of the 2013 Warsaw COP, Australia had had three PMs in one year, the then-
current being Tony Abbott. Just as the change in government in 2007 was accompanied 
by an act to distance the new government from the old (i.e. the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol), so too did the Coalition government seek to distance itself from the track record 
of the ALP. To achieve this, the government announced that for the first time since 1997 
Australia would not send a minister to the COP (McDonald 2013b). The Department of 
the Environment explained the absence of the Minister for the Environment Greg Hunt 
by saying that Hunt would be ‘fully engaged in repealing the carbon tax’ and thus unable 
to attend the climate conference (Packham 2013). Moreover, the PM espoused discourses 
silencing the possibility of future emissions reductions targets, by noting that Australia is 
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‘in no way looking to make further binding commitments’ (Taylor 2013). These actions 
clearly exemplify the marginalisation of discourses pertaining to carbon markets, 
international agreements and national targets. The only discourse which pushed for 
dominance was traditional economic thought, as demonstrated by Australia’s submission 
to the COP noting that Australia would only take action that was ‘fiscally and 
economically’ viable (UNAA 2013). 
4. Overview 
It is evident that there have been some very dramatic swings in the dominance of the 
discourses espoused at the COPs over the past several decades. The data support H5, as 
one of the most prescient dichotomies was the turmoil within the ethical discursive field: 
the battle for dominance between Australia doing only what is fair and thus acting in 
fellowship, or Australia assuming a position of leadership and acting as a climate change 
exemplar. Narratives representing both these positions were used to justify Australia’s 
role in the COPs, and thus its NCPR. Discourses from the economic field featured heavily, 
and occasionally scientific discourses were used in support, however there was, yet again, 
a noted absence of the social impact discursive field.  
Despite the variety in dominant and marginalised discourses witnessed at the 
international climate negotiations, and the support for H5, it is premature to ascribe the 
variations witnessed as stemming purely from the occurrence of the negotiations 
themselves. That is, it is unclear whether the relationship is one of correlation or causation. 
That being said, the contrast between the prominence of ethical discourses at the COPs 
against their relative absence from general politicking suggests that the international 
negotiations do influence the discourses presented. 
F .  S u m m a r y  
Although the above analyses identifies how the GLR is influenced by a variety of events, 
the list is by no means exhaustive. As mentioned in Section III, scholars have looked at a 
multitude of stimuli which impact on the policies of climate change. That being said, this 
thesis has unveiled several characteristics about the GLR, some intuitive and some 
unintuitive. 
The data has provided mixed support for the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of the 
paper. The observed influence of international climate negotiations, economic recessions 
and federal elections on the GLR was consistent with the hypotheses. As intuited, the 
1990s recession increased the significance of economic discourses in justifying and 
criticising the NCPR, the outcome of which has remained to this day. Federal elections (at 
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least after 2001) were used as opportunities to promote previously marginalised 
discourses to criticise the existing NCPR, or to justify policy promises. And international 
climate negotiations elicited a major increase in the salience of ethical narratives. Indeed, 
the legitimation rhetoric presented at the COPs were some of the only examples where 
economics did not always trump all other concerns (yet it still played a significant role). 
However, no clear relationship between natural disasters and the legitimation of climate 
change policies is visible from the data, especially with respect to the dominance of the 
social impact discursive field. Although there were mentions of the impact of climate 
change, these voices were largely in dissent, and failed to meaningfully influence the GLR. 
Curiously, natural disasters seemed to evoke responses of caution and scientific 
trepidation. By the same token, H1b found little support, revealing that narratives of the 
impact of climate change have rarely been used to justify or criticise the NCPR. 
Hypothesis 1b also intuited a significant role of the scientific discursive field in the GLR. 
This part of the hypothesis can be said to have received qualified support, as narratives 
of science have played frequent, but marginal, roles in the GLR. One might be forgiven 
for lamenting the fact that the most frequently employed discourses from the scientific 
field have been ones of climate change scepticism. This is an unexpected and potentially 
troubling observation, and has implications for policymakers (see Section VII). 
Perhaps most interestingly, no clear outcome regarding H1a was found. Providing 
support for this hypothesis were the observations that narratives of fossil fuels and 
traditional economics were used in correlation with NCPRs advocating typically 
voluntary measures, and that sustainable economic discourses were used to justify 
mandatory and more stringent policies. Conversely, narratives from the ethical, scientific, 
and political & legal discursive fields have been used to legitimate and criticise similar 
NCPRs. This realisation suggests a complex, non-linear correlation between the GLR and 
the NCPR. It also suggests that climate change policies may often be justified on bases 
that have nothing to with climate change itself. These observations cast doubt on the 
assumptions underpinning H1a, namely that governments are logical, mean what they 
say, and present coherent policy platforms. 
V I I .  C O N C L U S I O N  
This thesis has looked at how Australian climate change policy has been justified and 
legitimated over the past three decades, and how these justifications have been influenced 
by certain events. This was achieved by examining the government legitimation rhetoric, 
specifically its relationship with the national climate policy regime and how it changed 
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over time. A large variety of sources were analysed according to a predetermined 
structure designed to identify the dominant and marginalised discursive fields and 
discourses. It was found that there is a complex, non-linear relationship between the GLR 
and the NCPR, and that the economic discursive field is overwhelmingly hegemonic 
within the GLR. This suggests that economic concerns are the primary justifications 
behind Australia’s climate policy. This finding is reinforced by the marginalisation of 
other discursive fields during times of economic stress, such as the 1990s recession. Ethical 
discourses were also found to be relatively dominant, yet curiously they were used both 
to justify NCPRs that resisted reducing emissions and NCPRs that advocated mandatory 
reduction targets and carbon markets. Scientific narratives have played a similar role to 
ethical discussions, being used both to support and criticise NCPRs. Shamefully for 
Australia however, is that discourses of climate change scepticism are still dominant and 
resonate well within the public. This realisation goes a long way in explaining the 
dissonant nature of Australia’s NCPRs since 1987. Nevertheless, it was observed that 
elections are associated with increases in the salience of alternative discourses. This is 
indicative of the nature of politics, in that politicians campaign on platforms designed to 
win votes, and not necessarily with the best interests of the general populace in mind. 
Interestingly, natural disasters had little effect on the GLR. It was hypothesised that 
disasters might be viewed as a manifestation of climate change, and thus prompt changes 
in the GLR increasing the dominance of the social impact discourses. However this was not 
the case, possibly due to climate change scepticism, or the creeping normality of severe 
weather events. 
This thesis has cast a broad net, and assessed many different stimuli and their effects on 
the GLR. While some interesting observations have been made, there is arguably room 
for greater and deeper exploration of these relationships. Further research could be done 
on how the health of the global economy, as opposed to the domestic, affects the GLR. This 
thesis found prima facie evidence of the GFC being associated with a change in dominant 
discourse, despite the Australian economy being relatively strong. Moreover, while this 
thesis found scarce evidence connecting the passing of a natural disaster with changes in 
the justification of climate policy, perhaps a study involving a large sample size might 
uncover some interesting relationships regarding several high intensity disasters leading 
to a tipping point, or perhaps the occurrences of dramatically atypical weather (such as a 
blizzard in Brisbane, for argument’s sake) might reveal a relationship. Additionally it 
would be interesting to conduct cross-case comparisons, to see if countries that, for 
example, justify their NCPR with scientific discourses have been more successful at 
reducing emissions than countries with dominant economic discourses.  
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This thesis is not without its limitations. First and foremost, it focuses on only one case 
study—Australia since 1987. In terms of climate change, Australia might be something of 
an unusual case, as it has the unique combination of a large fossil fuel industry, a strong 
economy, and high susceptibility to the effects of climate change. Therefore, this may limit 
the generalisability of the findings of this paper. Moreover, climate change is a highly 
partisan issue in Australian politics. This being so, the methods employed in this thesis 
may not yield interesting insights if applied to other cases where climate change is less 
politically divided, such as in some European countries. 
This research also has implications for climate change policymakers. Firstly, as it shows 
that economic narratives are the primary justification of climate change policies, this 
thesis strikes home the necessity of robust economic modelling when determining climate 
change policy. One of the main rifts separating the traditional and sustainable 
justifications is the valuation of costs: traditional narratives heavily discount the future 
uncertainties associated with climate change; whereas sustainable perspectives consider 
that failing to act would be economically foolhardy. It is unlikely that a bridge between 
these camps can be formed until questions about climate change—specifically ‘how much, 
how fast and how costly’ it will be—can be answered by science (assuming governments 
are receptive to that science) (Nordhaus 2007, 701). Secondly, as discourses involving the 
science and social impact of climate change have been marginalised in Australia, 
policymakers might do well to incorporate these discourses in order to familiarise the 
people with its underlying causes, feedback loops, thresholds, and expected 
consequences. Perhaps then the nation would be less willing to accommodate such a 
highly divided and partisan portrayal of a possibly existential threat. 
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that Australia is still a long way from having a robust, 
coherent and effective climate change policy. Over the past three decades Australian 
climate change discourse has orbited around economic concerns, while neglecting issues 
of social impacts, climate justice, and scientific revelations. While economic feasibility and 
maintaining a low cost of living are legitimate concerns for politicians, so too should be 
ensuring a high standard of living for future generations. Imagine what they could have 
accomplished since 1987 if instead of offering competing climate change discourses, 
Australian politicians promoted a united narrative accepting the science behind climate 
change and advocating swift and effective action? 
In sum, climate change is not a conspiracy cooked up by an international cabal of 
meteorologists sponsored by the UN in order to attract more funding. Climate change is 
not just about melting snow or warming air. It is a security issue, and should be treated 
sincerely and not as political detritus. We do not exist in a vacuum: humanity is part of 
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the ecological environment and the economy relies on that environment. It is time that 
Australian politicians realised this, implemented appropriate policies, and stopped 
signing their own death warrant out of a fear of ‘clobber[ing] the economy’ (Glenday and 
Griffiths 2014). 
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I 
A P P E N D I X  A :  D I S C U R S I V E  F I E L D S  A N D  
P R O M I N E N T  D I S C O U R S E S  
(a) Economic 
The economic discursive field clusters all discourses regarding the economic effects of 
climate change, including effects on employment, trade, welfare and development. The 
prominent narratives are therefore traditional economic discourses and sustainable economic 
discourses (Böhringer and Vogt 2003; Grubb 2003; Harris and Roach 2009; Layton and 
Brown 2000; Neumayer 2000; Stern 2006; Garnaut 2011). Traditional narratives largely 
mirror neoliberal conceptualisations of market supremacy, the primacy of economic 
growth, increased consumption and extraction of resources, immediate costs, high future 
discounting, and the disregard of ‘ecological’ losses (such as biodiversity losses and 
decreased glacial density). Sustainable narratives are harder to define, yet include greater 
valuations of future costs, the valuation of ‘ecological’ losses, and conceptualisations of 
future competitiveness based on early adopters of renewable or sustainable technologies. 
(b) Scientific 
The scientific field essentially captures the discussion about the whether or not climate 
change (or global warming) is happening, and if so, why it is. Therefore, the prominent 
discourses of the scientific field are climate change scepticism (i.e. doubt of its occurrence), 
natural climate variability (i.e. acceptance of its occurrence but doubt as to the role of 
humanity), and anthropocentric climate change (i.e. acceptance that humanity is causing or 
accelerating climate change) (Hoffman 2010; Lahsen 2013; Antilla 2005; Poortinga et al. 
2011). Within the scientific community, the discourse of anthropocentric climate change 
is now hegemonic, however due to choices in governmental framing this hegemony is lost 
in policy discussions. 
(c) Energy & Technology 
The energy and technology field embraces discourses on existing technologies, possible 
technological developments and sources of energy (Turner 2012; Corner et al. 2011; 
Carson, Louviere, and Wei 2010; L. Clarke et al. 2009; Nordhaus, Houthakker, and Solow 
1973; Barrett 2008; Blackstock and Long 2010; Hulme 2012). Therefore, the main 
discourses are fossil fuels, nuclear and renewables. These are all largely self-explanatory, 
however two points are worth mentioning. The first is that despite its purported 
cleanliness, natural gas is included in the fossil fuel discourse. The second is that the 
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II 
renewables discourse also captures discussions of new technologies to capture and 
sequester carbon. 
(d) Ethical 
Ethical discourses capture concepts of climate justice and common but differentiated 
responsibilities. It involves considerations of the rights of non-human species. In the 
Australian context, two main discourses emerge: fellowship and leadership (Arce M 2001; J. 
Gupta and Grubb 2000; Heitzig, Lessmann, and Zou 2011; McDonald 2005; Ward, 
Grundig, and Zorick 2001; Stone 2004; Rajamani 2000; Elliott 2011; Roberts and Parks 2007; 
Sell 1996; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012). Leadership discourses are characterised by their 
emphasis on, unsurprisingly, leading the way in taking unilateral action against climate 
change. These discourses break free of the collective action problems and advocate 
individual action. The discourses of fellowship on the other hand advocate united, 
collective and conditional action. 
(e) Political & Legal 
This is perhaps the most interconnected field, as all its discourses are reliant on the 
discourses of other fields. This field captures debates on appropriate policies, such as 
carbon markets or support for the Kyoto Protocol (Aldy and Stavins 2007; Kellow 2006; 
Victor 2004; Bailey et al. 2012; Buizer and Lawrence 2013). Without identifying specific 
policies, the prominent discourses in this field are national emissions targets (either self-
imposed or those of Kyoto), carbon markets (such as carbon taxes or cap and trade systems), 
subsidising carbon-intensive industries to adopt cleaner practices (most noticeably the Direct 
Action policy), and support for binding international agreements (namely the Kyoto Protocol 
and its successor). 
(f) Social Impact 
Finally, the social impact field is adapted from Christoff’s “lived reality” field. Christoff 
does not develop this field very much, which is a significant shortcoming. Consequently, 
this field is morphed to capture the social impacts of climate change, specifically domestic 
impacts and international impacts (Carson, Louviere, and Wei 2010; Inglehart 1995; 
Lachapelle, Borick, and Rabe 2012; Lazarus 2010; Whitmarsh, Seyfang, and O’Neill 2011). 
Domestic impact discourses bring the nature of climate change home to ordinary citizens 
by explaining how they are likely to be affected. In contrast, international impact 
discourses distance societies from climate change by suggesting that it will be a greater 
problem elsewhere. 
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A P P E N D I X  B :  O V E R V I E W  O F  T H E  A U S T R A L I A N  
G O V E R N M E N T A L  L E G I T I M A T I O N  R H E T O R I C ,  
1 9 8 7 – 2 0 1 4  
The figure in this appendix provides a visual representation of the changes and trends in 
the Australian GLR form 1987 to 2014. It is not the result of a quantitative analysis, instead 
it is a qualitative interpretation of the main themes, discourses and narratives identified 
in the parsed sources. While this undoubtedly affects the reproducibility of the figure, it 
must be stressed that its purpose is as a visual shorthand to the observations outlined in 
VI.A: Australia’s Governmental Legitimation Rhetoric and Climate Policy Regime, 1987–2014. 
Moreover it can be used as a comprehension aid or as a mnemonic device when 
considering the remainder of the analysis in this thesis. 
Due to the size of the figure it appears on the next page. 
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Figure 4: Overview of the Evolution of the Australian Governmental Legitimation Rhetoric, 1987–2014. 
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